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USSR JOURNAL REVIEW OF VELIKHOV. SAGDEYEV SPACE ARMS BOOK

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNIYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 87 (signed to press 15 Apr 87) pp 123-126

[B. Surikov review: "Space Rubicon"]

[Text] The top-level Soviet-American negotiations in the Icelandic capital revealed two opposite approaches to world politics in terms of such vitally important problems for the entire international community as the banning of the testing and the elimination of nuclear weapons and also the banning of strike space-based arms. The American "star wars" plans are pushing mankind to the brink of nuclear catastrophe and complicating and poisoning the atmosphere in the world.

The United States simply does not wish to understand that the qualitative changes which the nuclear age has wrought do not permit the transfer into the future of the patterns of the past. The history of wars has accustomed us to the idea that the level of security of this country or the other depends to a considerable extent on the quantity and quality of arms which it possesses. At the present time the dependence between military potential proper and security proper is different. Now unilateral security, like security assured by a military-technological "miracle," is in practice untenable. The nuclear age demands a new approach to old and new problems of the security of the international community.

Since Reykjavik the present U.S. Administration, which is closely linked to the military-industrial complex, has been endeavoring to deceive the public and conceal from it the historic essence of the Soviet Union's proposals concerning the stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons before the end of the current century and is attempting to defend the SDI in every possible way. The book in question,* which was prepared by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat, is devoted to an analysis of the S&T, military-strategic and international-political aspects of this program. The authors justifiably assert that, in the event of its deployment, a broad-based ABM system would be an extremely dangerous multifunction strategic offensive and defensive system capable of destroying spacecraft with "space-to-space" weapons, wiping out particularly important administrative-industrial and military targets with "space-to-earth" weapons and also destroying with the aid of space-based, ground-to-space and ground-

based weapons the strategic missiles and their warheads which had survived a first strike and which the enemy would use in a retaliatory strike.

Analyzing the technical possibilities and limitations inherent in a broad-based ABM defense, the experts show convincingly the complexity of destroying ICBM's. One reason is that the number of warheads and decoys could exceed many times over the number of missiles launched. The typical makeup of an ICBM includes up to 10 independently targeted warheads and a multitude of decoys, which completely simulate warheads beyond the atmosphere. When repelling by an ABM system a group and, even more, a massive retaliatory nuclear strike under conditions of the oversaturation of its information facilities by a multitude of decoys, it would be extremely difficult to guarantee the high efficiency of ABM defenses.

The book rightly observes that it would be possible, for example, to use as the simplest decoys inflatable thin-walled balloons of metal-coated film, and the warheads themselves, moreover, could be accommodated in them (p 21). Given such a massive use of decoys, the ABM system would be confronted with a very difficult problem: wiping out all ballistic targets indiscriminately or making a prior selection of them and distinguishing the actual warheads beyond the atmosphere concealed by decoys. Both tasks would be extremely difficult. For this reason the effectiveness of the transatmospheric intercept of ICBM and MRBM under the conditions of the use of methods of simulation and decoy discrimination would be negligible. The combat potential of ABM weapons when destroying warheads in the atmosphere (at an altitude below 100 km) may also be reduced by the opposite side by way of the programmed detonation of nuclear warheads, which would complicate the functioning of the ABM radar and the guidance of the interceptors.

The monograph studies in detail the combat possibilities and prospects of the use for ABM purposes of various types of laser weapons. A split-chain reaction between fluorine and hydrogen serves as the source of the energy of a hydrogen fluoride chemical laser, whose development in the United States is currently the most advanced (p 31). A continuous chemical laser is achieved by way of the rapid injection of the working gas mixture via a resonator. In the current experimental installations the gas mixture is injected at supersonic speed. This installation is similar to an operating jet engine, which is a source of powerful vibrations, which is absolutely impermissible for space-based weapons. And, further. Hydrogen fluoride chemical lasers with a power of several megawatts are being developed in the United States currently, but a power several orders of magnitude higher would be necessary for ABM battle stations. Solving this problem would require the use of a set of units operating in parallel and thereby sharply increasing the size of the stations, which would render the prospects of use of the chemical laser in space-based systems highly doubtful.

Recently the United States has been promoting work on the creation of powerful excimer lasers, "in which unstable states of the chemical compounds of inert gases are the active agent" (p 35). Pulse reactions are initiated from external sources by way of an electrical charge in a gas agent. A special power system for excitation is not necessary for chemical lasers, but for excimer lasers with their low output this problem becomes paramount: it will

be essential to provide on the space-based battle station for a capacity of several hundred gigawatts, which, owing to weight and size limitations, is impracticable in the foreseeable period. For this reason the supporters of the SDI are orienting themselves toward a ground-space-based ABM system. It is contemplated with the beams of excimer lasers deployed on Earth destroying the enemy's missiles "with the use of a system of space-based mirrors, part of which could be positioned in geostationary orbit even" (p 37).

The book examines in greater depth and more thoroughly than foreign publications the nuclear-pumped X-ray laser, the experimental work on which was the direct reason for R. Reagan's advancement of the "strategic defense initiative" in March 1983. As shown, to destroy a solitary missile at a distance of 2,000 km it is necessary to employ in such a device a nuclear charge of no less than 50 kilotons and 10 to the power 5 metal rods evenly distributed around the element (p 43). The group detonation of such devices in near-Earth space would lead to the disruption of the functioning of ground- and space-based radar, which would severely reduce the efficiency of the ABM systems.

Research is being performed in two American science centers--Los Alamos and Livermore--on the creation of free-electron lasers based on linear high-current induction accelerators. The efficiency of modern lasers of this type constitutes only several percent, their power output is negligible and their physical dimensions are great. Whence, as the authors rightly conclude, the limited possibilities of the use of such weapons in ABM defenses and the highly remote prospect of their appearance in a ground-to-space version with the deployment in space of a complex system of mirrors.

The book comprehensively examines other types of weapons also--beam, kinetic, EMP. As the Soviet scientists rightly emphasize, all these weapons presupposed by the SDI program could only in the distant future meet the demands of a hypothetical U.S. ABM defense with space-based components. A comprehensive solution of this supercomplex technological and strategic task is as yet highly problematical. The main delusion of the SDI supporters is that negligible successes in the development of certain components are being equated with the possibility of the creation of an efficient ABM operational system.

The parameters of the potential weapons for destroying ballistic missiles which in the distant future might be used on ABM operational platforms leave no doubt that their mass would constitute many tens and hundreds even of tons. The leadership of the SDI program puts the trouble-free operating life of a space station at roughly 10 years (p 66). There is practically no experience in the United States of the creation of systems of such great dependability. The monograph observes that this problem is technically impracticable in the foreseeable period. Its complexity amounts primarily to the need to cater for the effective elimination of the surplus heat arising during operation of the battle station. Current methods of heat extraction, given large dimensions, are insufficiently reliable. There are other technological problems also without whose solution realizing a highly efficient territorial ABM system is impossible.

At the same time the book calls attention to the fact that, in the event of ABM battle stations being put in space, an aggressor might be tempted to deploy thereon missiles carrying nuclear weapons for the destruction of vitally important enemy targets. Consequently, the United States' deployment of a broad-based ABM system with space-based components would undoubtedly create a fundamentally new strategic situation. The Pentagon's multifunction common "C-cube-I" battle management system and a multitude of operational platforms in circumterrestrial orbit equipped with various long-range weapons would make highly attractive the idea of a "disarming" strike from space. The deployment of an operational system allegedly designed only for intercepting ballistic missiles could bring about a new twist of the nuclear arms race spiral not only on Earth but also in outer space, whither part of the nuclear power of the contending sides could be transferred.

The monograph comprehensively examines an extensive list of technologically practicable measures and means of countering attack space-based weapons. They could include both the creation of special weapons for destroying various components of a broad-based ABM system and an increase in and upgrading of strategic offensive arms (p 118). The analysis of these measures and countering weapons made by the Soviet scientists is a convincing illustration of M.S. Gorbachev's statement (8 August 1986) that the USSR would, if necessary, find an answer to the SDI, and it would not be, furthermore, what the United States expected: it would be an answer which would devalue the "star wars" program.

The monograph in question extends our notion of the great and fruitful activity being exercised by Soviet scientists in the defense of peace, to limit the arms race and prevent a nuclear catastrophe.

In conclusion we would express to the authors certain wishes in the event of the book being reprinted. It would seem advisable to supplement Chapter 4 ("Use of Weapons of a Space-Based Echelon for Strikes Against Air and Ground Targets") with a more detailed survey of the potential of this echelon of U.S. ABM defense for launching surprise attacks on enemy spacecraft with "space-to-space"-type weapons and also wiping out particularly important ground, sea and air targets with "space-to-earth"-type weapons. Questions pertaining to the third-generation nuclear weapons (microwave gamma-lasers, nuclear devices generating a powerful stream of high-energy particles, kinetic energy weapons) which are being built in the United States and tested at the Nevada firing range should also be examined more fully. Finally, it would be useful to dwell in more detail on questions of the functioning of the ABM operational platform support subsystems.

The said observations do not detract in the least from the scientific and political significance of the book, which shows convincingly the disastrous nature of the SDI for the cause of peace and international security.

FOOTNOTE

- * "Kosmicheskoye oruzhiye: dilemma bezopasnosti" [Space Weapons: Dilemma of Security]. Edited by Ye.P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, R.Z. Sagdeyev, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Prof A.A. Kokoshin, doctor of historical sciences, Moscow, "Mir", 1986, pp 182.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987

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USSR: U.S. SPACE ARMS PROGRAMS VIOLATE ABM TREATY

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 6, Jun 87 pp 79-86

[Article by Irina Kuznetsova and Yuri Orlov under the rubric "An Analyst's Views": "The Hypocrisy of Washington's ABM Treaty Exponents"]

[Text]

On March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced that the United States was proceeding with plans for changing the course of human history. He declared that he would spare no effort to save our planet from the threat of a nuclear war and that for this purpose he was ordering a comprehensive and intensive research and development programme, that was subsequently called the Strategic Defense Initiative. At the same time, the head of the White House gave assurances that he had no intention of violating the United States' obligations under the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) signed and ratified by the USSR and the USA in 1972.

A little over three years later the events and results of the Soviet-US meeting in Reykjavik revealed to all peoples and countries the real objectives of the present US administration's foreign policy. The United States turned down a genuine possibility to come to an agreement on the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a ten-year period. It blocked the road to a nuclear-free world with the SDI programme, asserting that the United States must have the right to test and conduct research into everything that is related to the Star Wars plans not only in laboratories but also outside them, including in outer space. It refused, thereby, to endorse the interpretation of the ABM Treaty underlying the decision of the US Congress to ratify that instrument. Washington also foiled a possible agreement on strengthening the regime of this treaty. It was pursuing a different objective—nullification of the ABM Treaty and continuation of the arms race. The SDI programme turned out to be a programme of refusing nuclear disarmament. It required the US administration to adopt the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty which was clearly admitted by Ronald Reagan during one of his recent press conferences, when he said, that as work under the SDI programme and the development of the SDI systems progressed, the United States came to realise that a moment was near when a narrow interpretation of the treaty could hamper it and hold back the work in developing new systems.

The Soviet Union has unambiguously expressed its attitude to Star Wars and its advocates, emphasising that the danger of SDI lies in that it paves the way for the creation of a new generation of strategic weapons which can emerge as a means of aggression even more sinister than nuclear weapons.

The Soviet side has repeatedly warned that apologists of the nuclear arms race are at the same time zealous promoters of the SDI programme

and that now it is important to prevent Star Wars from being used both as a stimulus to a continued arms buildup and a roadblock on the way to radical disarmament. After Reykjavik this need has become even more evident.

All this raises the major question: What is the real attitude of the United States to the treaty? US leaders have declared that treaties must be respected, that they are the law of international life, the principal criterion without which confidence and normal relations among states are not possible. How many times have they repeated these phrases—hypocritically. But the situation with the ABM Treaty is something quite special.

On October 14, 1985, the US Secretary of State George Shultz stated: "Our research program is and will continue to be consistent with the ABM treaty. The treaty can be variously interpreted as to what kinds of development and testing are permitted, particularly with respect to future systems and components based on new physical principles. The treaty's text, the agreed statements accompanying it, the negotiating record, and official statements made since that time are subject to different interpretations."¹

There are naturally, many ways to interpret things. The point is what purpose is being pursued: clarification of the will of the sides which found its reflection in the provisions of the treaty to ensure its strict observance and to preserve the state of affairs it is called upon to establish; or distortion of the meaning of this agreement, perverting of its spirit and letter in order to shirk its observance and, ultimately, bury it altogether.

The very first article of the ABM Treaty clearly states: "Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense." Yet the head of the US administration whose direct responsibility it would appear to be to see to it that this solemn obligation is respected, instead publicly sets for its country the objective of developing a system capable of intercepting and destroying "strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies",² that is to say, to commit an act which is specifically banned by the ABM Treaty, since to intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reach the territory of the United States means deploying an ABM system on US territory.

Thus a long-term programme for the violation of the treaty was proclaimed and is being implemented. In an effort to cover up and justify these illegal acts, Washington resorts to legal chicanery, sophistry and sometimes downright deception.

One of its ploys consists in making allegations that the provisions of Article I of the treaty, prohibiting each party from deploying ABM systems for a defence of its country's territory or to provide a base for such a defence, by no means give it a definitive meaning, that the treaty also contains other articles moderating the significance of this ban and, allegedly, even paves the way for its modification and abrogation.

At the same time, it is obvious that all other provisions of this document and the texts of the Agreed Statements to it fully bear out and substantiate the content of Article I. For example, Article V of the treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based. This is a comprehensive ban. It covers not only the deployment of

¹ *The New York Times*, Oct. 15, 1985.

² *The New York Times*, March 24, 1983.

ABM systems but also their development and testing. It concerns not only entire systems but equally their components as well. The purport of the treaty is to prohibit and prevent the emergence of any large-scale ABM systems, to create conditions that would preclude the possibility of one of the parties suddenly breaking this restriction and tipping the balance in strategic defence systems established by the ABM Treaty. As a result this would pave the way for the reduction and elimination of strategic offensive arms.

The only exception to this strict and practically comprehensive ban are fixed land-based ABM systems permitted by the treaty. However, there are strict limits in this area, too. Thus, the deployment of these systems is confined to one area having a radius of 150 kilometres where a party may deploy no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, as well as a limited number of ABM radars.

Since the deployment of ABM systems is permitted in limited areas, Article VII provides for the modernisation and replacement of fixed systems and their components. This presupposes the development and testing of such systems. However, testing must be carried out only at agreed test ranges and nowhere else. The US ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific, the USSR's test ranges are in Sary Shagan and in Kamchatka. It must be emphasised that only systems and their components permitted by the treaty and not prohibited by it may be developed and tested.

In addition to that, Article VI envisages measures to enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components. For this purpose the sides undertake not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

As for ABM systems (Article VIII) or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in the treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by the treaty, they must be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible period of time.

The provisions of the document given above unambiguously demonstrate that the 1972 ABM Treaty not only forbids the United States from developing and possessing a system, capable of intercepting and destroying strategic ballistic missiles before they reach American territory, but strictly prohibits the implementation of this programme and prescribes that any such system or their components, should they come into the possession of the United States, be immediately destroyed.

It is namely these systems and components that are being currently developed in the United States under the SDI programme, with the US government going all out to prove that it is complying with the treaty.

Sometimes it is stated that the restrictive provisions of the above agreement are not applicable to ABM systems based on new, so-called exotic technologies, such as lasers, particle beam weapons, etc. In order to justify this claim references are made to Article II of the treaty which defines an ABM system as a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of: ABMs, which are interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, ABM radars. In this context it is alleged that "exotic" ABM systems will not comprise interceptor missiles, their launchers and radars, and consequently, neither they

and their components fall under the restrictive provisions of the ABM Treaty.

However, the question of "exotic systems" was not ignored by the negotiators of the treaty. As is known, there is Agreed Statement D which reads: "In order to insure fulfilment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty."

Today attempts are made in the United States to interpret the Statement D to mean that development and testing of the so-called exotic systems as distinct from fixed ones defined in Article II, are permitted; it is alleged that they are covered by one restriction only related to their deployment which must be preceded by consultations of the parties which may result in amendments to the treaty.

This is a fallacious argument, a fact which is also pointed out by many US lawyers.² The definition contained in Article II is clearly applicable to any ABM system capable of countering strategic ballistic missiles. The formula "currently" added to the text is by no means accidental. It attests to the fact that the draftsmen of the treaty anticipated that an ABM system may also comprise in the future components other than the ones listed in the treaty, but this must by no means be used as a pretext for placing it outside its scope of application. In the past this was confirmed by a member of the US delegation at the SALT I negotiations, Raymond Garthoff: "The word 'currently' was deliberately inserted into a previously adopted text of Article II... in order to have the very effect of closing a loophole to the ban" on the future systems.³ In other words, Americans were deliberately blocking the very same loophole that they would like to resort to now.

Thus this document does not give the "green light" to the development and testing of any ABM systems and their components based on other physical principles. Moreover, a broader interpretation of the Agreed Statement D is impermissible for yet another reason: its very purpose is to ensure the fulfilment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems except as provided in Article III of the treaty, that is, in one limited deployment area and a fixed land-based version. But if in this case it concerns the deployment of some elements with due account of the above mentioned limitation of so-called exotic systems, this would be permissible only after corresponding consultations or, in other words, with the consent of both sides and, naturally, after the treaty itself has been changed, also with the consent of its signatories.

Therefore it is safe to say that the provisions of Statement D give no chance for "thunking up" any easement or cancellation of what is in principle envisaged by Article V.

The ABM Treaty has a clearly defined objective and explicit formulations. Incidentally, the US administration did not question this right up to the moment when the work was started on the SDI programme which forced US politicians and lawyers to feverishly look for ways to undermine the treaty since it outlaws the very aim of this programme. Suffice it to recall the accompanying letter of the US President to the Senate attached to the above-mentioned document which, among other things, states that a "potential problem dealt with by the Treaty is that which

² See A. Chaves, A. Chaves, E. Spitzer, *Space Weapons: The Legal Context*; *Daedalus*, "Weapons in Space", Vol. II, Summer 1985, p. 199.

³ *International Security*, Summer 1977, p. 108.

would be created if an ABM system were developed in the future which did not consist of interceptor missiles, launchers and radars. The Treaty would not permit the deployment of such a system or of components thereof".⁵ The President's letter also confirms that the deployment even of these components is prohibited for any systems other than fixed land-based systems.

It is obvious that the US President's message reflected the way in which he and Congress understand their obligations under the treaty. According to this understanding, as Chayes and Spitzer point out, the ABM Treaty contains a broad prohibition of ABM systems (not only on their deployment, but also on their development and testing) and a very narrowly defined and explicit exception to this comprehensive ban related to fixed land-based systems in one limited deployment area.⁶ This reading of the treaty was repeatedly stated by US officials. Thus, Secretary of State William Rogers said that the restrictive provisions of the treaty are also applicable to systems based on other physical principles.⁷

US Defense Secretary Melvin Laird admitted to a total ban on any development, testing or deployment of space-based ABM systems—in other words, a ban on the objectives pursued under the SDI programme—including systems based on exotic technologies. In this connection he made the following declaration: "There is, however, a prohibition on the development, testing, or deployment of ABM systems which are space-based... There are no restrictions on the development of lasers for fixed, land-based ABM systems. The sides have agreed, however, that deployment of such systems which would be capable of substituting for current ABM components... shall be the subject to discussion."⁸ Former head of the US delegation at the SALT I negotiations and head of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Gerard Smith, also shared this view, "...my understanding of the ABM Treaty is that... development, testing and deployment of sea, air, space, or mobile land-based systems was banned; if land-based systems are developed using so-called 'exotic' components—lasers, particle accelerators, etc.—they could not be deployed unless the treaty was amended."⁹

In brief, this question is sufficiently clear. When on October 14, 1985 US Secretary of State George Shultz suddenly "discovered" various possible interpretations of the ABM Treaty, particularly with reference to systems and components based on new physical principles, he was disingenuous.

What other arguments is the US administration putting forward now to prove that black is white and white is black?

In accordance with one line of reasoning SDI is purely a "research" programme and research, as distinct from the "development" of space-based ABM systems and their components, is not prohibited by the treaty.

When during a Senate hearing Senator Jackson asked Gerard Smith who has already been quoted here, to provide clarifications on this issue in connection with the ratification of the treaty, the latter gave the following answer to Congressmen: "The prohibitions on development contained in the ABM Treaty would start at that part of the development process where field testing is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard model. It was understood by both sides, that the prohibition on the 'development' applies to activities involved after a component moves from the

⁵ 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972, House Doc. 311, pp. 9-10.

⁶ See *Daedalus*, Vol. 11, p. 200.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972, pp. 40-41.

⁹ 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983, p. 180.

laboratory development and testing stage to the field testing stage, wherever performed. The fact that the early stages of the development process, such as laboratory testing, would pose problems for verification by national technical means is an important consideration in reaching this definition."¹⁰

The definition of the term "development" as any activity implemented outside a laboratory has been repeated by US officials a number of times after the ratification of the 1972 Treaty, too.

President Reagan's refusal during the Reykjavik meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev to consent to a mutual understanding that the work on new ABM systems and their components would not go beyond the stage of laboratory research and testing and to agree on this basis not to use the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years proved an all-the-more-significant act of self-exposure for current US exponents of the ABM Treaty. Even if there was somebody who needed proof that the SDI programme was by no means oriented at pursuing research objectives, after Reykjavik this is superfluous. It is clear that the United States is conducting work aimed at ultimately undermining and destroying this treaty, concealing its breach of the treaty obligations behind worthless words.

Another argument used by the US side to justify the programme of developing space strike weapons is the allegation that the treaty by no means prohibits the development of ABM system components that are not defined by its text, i. e. interceptor missiles, their launchers and ABM radars. In other words, if the SDI programme managers develop any component of a space weapon system considered incapable of performing the functions which are currently performed by interceptor missiles permitted by the ABM Treaty, their launchers and ABM radars, then, allegedly, the treaty would not be violated. It is rightfully pointed out in US scientific literature that systems being developed within the framework of the SDI programme cannot be totally analogous to interceptor missiles, their launchers and the existing ABM radars if only for no other reason than that they are intended for a basically different purpose, that of ensuring not local but large-scale anti-ballistic missile defence. Evidently, the very distribution of functions of components in such a system would most likely be different in a fixed land-based ABM system covering a relatively small area. It may well be that eventually a space-based ABM system will comprise elements none of which performs the functions of the elements (components) of the present ABM systems.¹¹

The whole thrust of the ABM Treaty, particularly of Article V, is to preclude the deployment of large-scale ABM systems and to prevent the development of such systems and their components. In this context assertions that this prohibition is invalidated the moment some "wizards" develop a large-scale ABM system, having segmented it into components other than interceptor missiles, their launchers and ABM radars, are ridiculous. It is also absurd to claim that the treaty is not violated when some components of a space-based ABM system, such as, for instance, a laser or a laser beam mirror, are tested on the laboratory premises and do not exist, as it were, from a legal point of view, as a prohibited part of the system. In line with this argument, when a detection, tracking and guidance system intended for these components and installed on a space shuttle, is tested in outer space on the missile plume, it should not be regarded as a violation of the treaty, since in itself it does not constitute a violation and considered separately it does not count. This is no interpretation of the treaty, this is trickery.

¹⁰ *Ducatus*, Vol. II, pp. 202-203.

¹¹ See A. Chaves, A. Chaves, E. Spitzer, *Op. cit.*, p. 204.

In further justification of this approach it is stated that the work under the SDI programme, including testing, will be carried out at considerably lower technical parameters than the ones that are needed to ensure the effective functioning of a space-based ABM system. In the US Congress and elsewhere, the US side rather frequently relies on this logic in presenting a case for the legality of the R&D work being conducted or planned under the SDI programme. But this is a flawed argument. It may well be that some parameters of the space strike weapon systems being developed by the US Star Wars architects fall short of the level required for the effective application of such systems and their components. Despite great efforts, so far they are still incapable of cracking numerous technical problems which will apparently remain outstanding for quite some time yet. However, how this situation can be used to justify the work being pursued by the United States to develop a prohibited large-scale ABM defence system remains a mystery known only to the lawyers in the Pentagon, the State Department and the ACDA.

It is also claimed that much of the work conducted under the SDI programme can have a dual application. For instance, specific components of an ABM system may be tried out within the framework of developing anti-satellite weapons for which, as is known, the treaty limitations do not apply. ABM systems intended for the interception of ballistic missiles in outer space would undoubtedly be capable of destroying satellites, since satellites are much easier to detect, track and destroy than are missile warheads. Consequently, many technological principles used in fighting satellites should be essentially the same as the ones that can be used to counter ballistic missiles in the upper layers of the atmosphere and in outer space. Therefore, it is argued in Washington, how to keep the USA from saying that it is making anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), while in the meantime it is making both ASATs and space defence means under the guise of ASATs. This is the same logic used by a clergyman who, having decided to treat himself to forbidden food during Lent, baptised a pig a carp.

The tactic the US administration uses to undermine the ABM Treaty is short-sighted. Having embarked on the road of violating this agreement, Washington, despite obvious political, military and legal facts, is still trying to hide its unlawful acts and troubled conscience behind unworthy legal chicanery. It persists in doing so even though it becomes increasingly clear that the United States will not be able to deploy a secure space-based ABM system neither in the form of ASAT programmes, nor in the form of developing limited area ABM systems based on other physical principles, nor in the form of creating systems to counter medium-range or tactical missiles. More likely than not, these exercises will have disappointing results. The United States will not acquire an anti-satellite shield and will lose the ABM Treaty with all the ensuing consequences for its own security and the strategic stability for the entire world. There is no need to point out that this is an irresponsible approach. Many US scientists, military men and diplomats have expressed their concern on this account. For instance, in March 1987 six former US Defense Secretaries spoke out in support of the above document. In a message to President Ronald Reagan, they stressed that the United States should continue to abide by the traditional or narrow interpretation of the important provision of the Treaty prohibiting the development and testing of ABM systems on aircraft, ships or in outer space.

Speaking on Soviet TV after the Reykjavik meeting Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that "the key task is to strengthen the ABM regime. In order to proceed with the reduction of nuclear weapons, there must be total confi-

dence that the United States will not do anything behind the back of the USSR, and the USSR will also not do anything behind the back of the United States that would jeopardise each other's security and render the agreement worthless. The solution to this problem is obvious: not to proceed with the implementation of space arms programmes outside laboratories, not to use the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. This is the key to finding a solution to the nuclear disarmament problem.

By refusing to abide by the treaties on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, by rejecting the possibility of ending nuclear tests and by proceeding with the buildup and modernisation of nuclear arms, Washington, no matter how hard it is trying to prove the contrary, is bent on undermining the ABM Treaty, and on giving the nuclear arms race a qualitatively new dimension. By twisting the meaning of this important document, by weakening its regime, the United States is thereby also undermining the treaty and, what is no less important, its own credibility as a partner on the international scene in the vitally important search for ways to curb the arms race.

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USSR: DANGER OF ACCIDENTAL WAR FROM PROGRAMMING ERRORS

Moscow GOLOS RODINY in Russian No 22, Jun 87 pp 12-13

[Interview with Irakliy Gverdtseteli, Georgian SSSR Academy of Sciences academician, by an Academy of Pedagogical Sciences reviewer, under the rubric "No - To Nuclear Madness": "Do We Hand the Fate of the World to Robots?]

[Text] [Question] A little more than four years ago President Reagan stated his plans to create an extremely effective space "shield" which would not only reliably cover the U.S. against Soviet missiles, but would also have the decisive role in the fight against a nuclear threat. Do Soviet scientists still feel, as they did then, that the off-spring of Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), an anti-missile system with space-based elements, would unavoidably become a factor that would violate strategic stability, undermine the foundation of peace and bring a nuclear catastrophe closer?

[[Answer] This is not the conclusion of only authoritative representatives from Soviet science, but also that of the overwhelming majority of our foreign colleagues. And as to recent events, this conclusion was again supported by the authority of more than 200 scientists from dozens of both Eastern and Western countries who took part in "round table" work by natural scientists, the most important component in the international "Movement for a Nuclear-Free World and for the Survival of Mankind" forum. The scientifically-based conclusion on the destabilizing and very dangerous nature of SDI is extremely important to understanding the quality of the threat that links the area from the depths of the sea to the depths of space into a single theater of war.

[Question] But is it possible that conclusions of this type are related only to the full-scale version of the SDI system and not to the near-future version? Maybe the deployment of individual SDI elements will not represent a serious threat to peace?

[Answer] No, that is not correct. The less improved and less suitable the ABM system is in carrying out its defensive functions in its practical state, the more tempted one would be to use it for the function that it is most suited for in its final form, launching a nuclear first strike.

[Question] Do you really mean to look at the threat of a first strike when everyone knows that in today's world this step would have the the most savage and tragic consequence for the one who decided to take it? After all, isn't it true that the terms "nuclear winter" and "global ecological catastrophe" have entered the lexicon not only of scientists, but also of politicians?

[Answer] Let us begin with the fact that the new scientific confirmation of the truth that "the one who makes a first strike will be the second to die" that we have obtained in recent years has obviously not reached all of those that it simply must reach. To this day the U.S., England and France have not taken on the obligation of not being the first to use nuclear weapons; none of the hoped-for changes have been adopted in U.S. or NATO military doctrine (they both include the possibility of making a first strike). And there is just one more thing that keeps one from overestimating the "independent" origins of this piece of knowledge: the recognition that the inadmissibility of nuclear war still does not signify an automatic refusal of that policy and the idea of the "fix" which is -- to rule over the world and control the events and processes that take place in it. The reaction of forces that rely on such a policy shows the old method of thinking, a search for an exit to the familiar force lines, and an attempt to cut one's way to superiority along new avenues. SDI is just such an attempt at a breakthrough: by militarizing space and by forming a fundamentally new theater of war and a new weapon for aggression at a time that is determined by the owner of an extensive ABM system.

[Question] Does this mean that on principle the chance that an inhabitant of Europe, Asia, North and Central America and Africa who falls asleep at night has of waking up the next morning before the fatal moment when the owner of the shield-and-sword pushes the renovated nuclear "button" will be about the same that it is today, fifty years into the nuclear era?

[Answer] Unfortunately we must have no illusions on that score. The phenomenon of the "accidental outbreak of nuclear war" is the key to understanding the nature and scope of the SDI threat. A strike that is catastrophic for the fate of civilization and that one side could inflict on the other not because of evil intentions, but, for example, because of a series of technical mistakes as a result of the appearance of a gigantically large technical system for military and combat use in space takes on a degree of probability that simply must be considered.

[Question] But let us suppose that the program is written without errors. Can we sleep soundly in this case?

[Answer] It is unavoidable in a really effective system such as we are discussing that one system (an equivalent or an anti-system) be opposed by another that is constructed, and this is fundamentally important, using another type of logic. The two systems that do not understand each other together form a third through positive feedback. Even with the most error-free programming in its component parts, it would be able to push the world to the brink of an unsanctioned nuclear war. This may happen because of accidental interference or because of a sudden "build-up" in its systems that causes it to go into self-provocation.

[Question] Let us try to formulate a general conclusion.

[Answer] That conclusion is: the appearance of the very first component of an ABM defense with space-based elements such as SDI will sharply complicate the search for approaches to radically reduce nuclear weapons. The scientific-technical principle of "eliminating the human factor" that its creators incorporated in SDI would indeed take on apocalyptic importance.

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TASS VIEWS WEINBERGER REMARKS ON SDI

LD241619 Moscow TASS in English GMT 1617 24 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 24 TASS -- TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger has once again tried to "substantiate" the need for a speeded-up realisation of the "Star Wars" programme, and stated that a "first phase deployment" of the SDI could begin as early as 1994 or 1995.

In an article published in THE NEW YORK TIMES newspaper recently, the U.S. secretary of defence virtually debunked the main "myth" of the SDI's "benefits" to mankind, the myth which had been earlier made use of by himself and President Ronald Reagan.

The dream of SDI, as it was visualized by Washington from the very outset -- the dream of an "impenetrable missile shield" for the United States and its allies -- has fully given way to a "partially effective defence".

Mr Weinberger, not embarrassed in the least, now refers to the dream itself as a "strategic extreme" and a "classic straw man" which was ostensibly invented by SDI opponents to prove that the programme is not feasible.

Neither does the Pentagon chief need "exotic" systems of space weapons. The main thing for him is to deploy in space if only some types of weapons as soon as possible. Serving as a "cover" is the thesis about "phased" deployment of SDI, for "a complete defensive system cannot be deployed overnight".

He completely forgot the U.S. President's declarative statement known to the whole world that if strategic defensive systems are combined with offensive ones, they can be viewed upon as a factor promoting an aggressive policy.

Ronald Reagan's above-mentioned statement was followed by assertion that the United States did not want that. Mr Weinberger now says explicitly that the USA not only wants it but, actually, craves for it.

"Deterrence, strategic stability and arms reductions all could benefit from a first SDI phase", U.S. secretary of defence maintains unfoundedly.

Quite a number of specialists, political figures and experts, not only around the world but also directly in the United States itself, point out the danger of such a situation. The establishment of such an anti-missile defence system, they argue, would signify the preparation of a technical basis for the conduct of nuclear war, which in its turn would make it possible to speak of nuclear war as a "thinkable" one. Hence there would be one step to "legalizing" a political decision to unleash a nuclear conflict.

The Pentagon's "strategic design" is quite clear. Firstly, to upgrade the American strategic offensive capability, to upset the military-strategic parity, and to ensure the possibility of delivering a first "disarming" nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. This is precisely the aim for the sake of which the accuracy and power of U.S. nuclear systems are being enhanced.

Secondly, to deploy new U.S. strategic space-based forces designed to hit targets on the ground, in the atmosphere and in outer space, thereby multiplying offensive capabilities of the strategic forces of "classic" type.

According to U.S. specialists, space strike weapons deployed under SDI could be used for strikes from space against aircraft, ships, tankers, oil and gas storage facilities, chemical plants, command posts, communications and control centres, and so on.

Thirdly, to protect the USA with an anti-missile "shield" (even if that would be an imperfect one). In a certain manner reducing the Soviet Union's capabilities for a retaliatory strike.

An ineffective strategic defence system, which does not reduce damage from a massive attack down to an "acceptable level", is obviously needed by the one who is not supposed to expect such a strike.

Such a system is needed for defence against a weakened retaliatory strike.

With this end in view, a 50 per cent cut in strategic offensive potentials of the sides, which Washington representatives speak of so much now, would 'suit' the Pentagon quite well: Such a cutback would make it possible to raise SDI's effectiveness in intercepting the other side's missiles that would remain after their preliminary reduction and the delivery of a "disarming" strike.

Casper Weinberger himself stated earlier that if the USA gets a system which would render the Soviet Union's arms "useless", the USA would be able to return to the situation when it was the only country possessing nuclear weapons.

Can, in the light of all this, an arms reduction process be of "benefit", as Mr Weinberger maintains, as a result of the deployment of a first phase of SDI? No, of course, it cannot.

In such conditions the USSR will not go to a reduction of its strategic offensive potential, and it will not with its own hands help the USA in weakening it. To count on that is an absolutely prospectless thing.

As far as strategic stability is concerned, it would obviously turn into its opposite. The impossibility of a confident strategic planning and an unpredictable development of events would lead to the need to take decisions as quickly as possible in any critical or near critical situation, decisions which may prove fatal to universal peace.

What kind of "the strengthening of deterrence" can one speak of? Nuclear war may break out not only as a result of a deliberate decision but also of attempts at (?blackmail) or a wrong estimate by one side of the intentions or actions of the other side, and as the consequence of someone's unconsidered act brought about by a sudden aggravation of the situation.

The danger of an outbreak of nuclear war as a result of error, technical malfunction of sophisticated computer devices controlling the SDI system should not be written off either.

So, Washington's tactic of "shielding" the SDI changes: The "myths" created by the White House and the Pentagon are being debunked, and other ones are being built in their place.

However, real dangers posed to the world by the plans and practical deeds of "Star Wars" crusaders remain the same.

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USSR JOURNAL ON EUROPEAN VIEWS OF INF, SDI

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 87 (signed to press 15 Jun 87) pp 6-19

[Article by A. Likhotal: "In the European Direction"]

[Text] In its long history the cradle of modern civilization--Europe--has given birth to the most diverse forces and currents. The creative power of revolutionary storms which swept away rotten regimes has changed the fate not only of the continent but of all mankind. Its soil, abundantly irrigated subsequently with the blood of many generations, gave the world such splendid examples of the power of the spirit and reason as Copernicus and Gallileo, Bruno and Lomonosov. However, the bonfires of the Inquisition blazed and the misanthropic ideology of fascism arose on this same soil. In the 20th century alone two world wars have deprived Europe of 55 million of its sons and daughters. But for over 40 years now the forces of creation have prevailed here over the forces of destruction, and the "continent of savages," as J. Jaures called Europe, is gradually becoming a continent of peace and civilized international relations. True, a long path has still to be trodden to the conclusive solution of the main question of the present day--man's deliverance from fear for his future. So to where on this path is the vector of West European power turned today?

I

E. Luard, former minister of state at the British Foreign Office, writes dejectedly in the journal INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: "In terms of summary GNP the EC countries have outpaced both the United States and the USSR. The EC countries are also superior to them in terms of the overall numbers of population. The Community's armed forces include the nuclear power of two of its members and number over 2 million men. The members of the Community possess long and varied experience of conducting international affairs. They are closely linked within the framework of an integrated political association which was the pioneer of such international cooperation. They represent a most ancient and rich culture. Why, then, is the chorus of their voices so faintly audible in international affairs?" (1). Indeed, what is preventing West Europe speaking at full voice?

Questions of war and peace, security and disarmament are the axis of

contemporary politics. These are today the touchstone of state wisdom and realism, and the level of responsibility of statesmen and the policy they pursue is determined in full in the approaches to them. This is explained by the fact that never before has mankind borne such a heavy burden of responsibility for its fate as now, when it has become aware of its "mortality" and when the very concept of "war" has been suffused with the ominous meaning of total self-genocide. Until now civilization has marched from millennium to millennium, leaving behind it rivers of blood and bringing suffering to millions and millions of people. Only 300 out of the 4,000 years of recorded history have been peaceful. Now, however, mankind has "matured" to the time when it is left with no choice in the dilemma of war or peace. "...The modern world has become too small and fragile for wars and power politics," the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th party congress emphasized.

However, the danger of a new world war has not been ruled out, and this war could erupt precisely where merely a narrow strip of land separates the most powerful military-political groupings. In a word, it is in Europe that the nuclear-space age makes of politicians demands of particular responsibility and realism.

Certainly, therefore, nowhere but on our continent do the two opposite approaches to the solution of the problem of the preservation of peace in the world, the two types of thinking and the two political philosophies clash so graphically. The spiritually revolutionary and essentially realistic philosophy of security for all based on a reduction in arms and disarmament as far as the complete elimination of weapons of mass annihilation is on the offensive in this confrontation. This approach is represented by the policy of the USSR and the other socialist countries and also realistic social and political forces of West Europe.

Demonstrating new political thinking not in words but in practice, the Soviet Union has in the period which has elapsed since the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum implemented a whole set of measures aimed at an improvement in the international atmosphere and a strengthening of peace and international security. The 27th CPSU Congress elaborated a program of the creation of an all-embracing system of international security. A large-scale program of mankind's liberation from nuclear weapons by the year 2000 was put forward. The elimination of Soviet and American medium-range and operational-tactical missiles and the destruction of chemical weapons and the industrial base of their manufacture were proposed. The unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions was extended five times. Far-reaching proposals pertaining to a reduction in conventional arms and armed forces and tactical nuclear arms on the European continent were advanced. Convincing evidence of an endeavor to realize the principles of the new political thinking was the Delhi Declaration on the Principles of a Nonviolent World Free of Nuclear Weapons signed on 27 November 1986 by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi. There was a series of top-level meetings with leaders of major capitalist countries of Europe and America. An important event of international life was the working meeting between the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President which took place 11-12 October 1986 in Reykjavik. And although owing to Washington's obstructionist position it was not possible embodying the agreement on

cardinal questions of disarmament which had practically been achieved in binding accords, the struggle for nuclear disarmament reached a new frontier.

A unique situation from both the military and political viewpoints took shape in Europe after the USSR, on 28 February 1987, had proposed separation of the problem of medium-range missiles (INF) in Europe from the set of interrelated questions of nuclear disarmament and the conclusion of a separate agreement thereon with the United States. For the first time in Europe's postwar history there is an opportunity for the elimination of a whole class of nuclear arms. In order to facilitate the immediate conclusion of the appropriate agreement the Soviet Union displayed good will, expressing a readiness for a constructive solution of the problem of operational-tactical missiles, which the West had attempted to use to drag out a solution of the question concerning the elimination of INF.

Specifically, the USSR proposes:

the elimination within the next 5 years of all Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe given preservation merely of 100 warheads each on such missiles in the Asian part of the USSR and on U.S. territory;

the elimination simultaneously of Soviet and American operational-tactical missiles in Europe and negotiations on such missiles in the east of our country and on the territory of the United States;

the establishment of the strictest system of verification, as far as on-site inspection, of compliance with the commitments assumed by the parties in this connection;

the examination and solution of the question of tactical nuclear systems in Europe, including tactical missiles, at separate multilateral negotiations in accordance with the Budapest initiative of the Warsaw Pact states on a reduction in armed forces and conventional arms on the European continent--from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Such a dependable foundation as the all-European process, which, following the serious upheavals brought about by Washington's confrontationist policy, is now revealing a trend toward further development, may be taken as the basis by the peoples of the European continent in the joint search for methods of ensuring its peaceful future. The results of the first stage of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe testify to this, in particular. Under current conditions particular importance is attached to the task of the combination of questions of security and disarmament within the framework of the all-European process. The adoption by the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee on 28-29 May 1987 of the document "Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact States," which contains the proposal that the NATO countries hold consultations for the purpose of comparing the military doctrines of the two alliances, analyzing their character and jointly examining the directions of their further evolution, contributes to the solution of these questions.

The increasingly full practice of political communication between European

states and the increased frequency of reciprocal visits of leaders of European states and governments, during which there is an extended comparison of positions and a clarification of one another's intentions, also testify to the establishment of new relations on the continent.

However, the process of crystallization of new approaches and evaluations is being impeded by "power" thinking, which has been out of time since the onset of the nuclear era. Shaped by the centuries-old history of international relations, when war was the loyal servant of policy, it has today taken refuge in the North Atlantic alliance and mainly in influential circles of such most important European NATO states as the FRG, Great Britain and France. What is the political credo of the forces which are determining these countries' foreign policy strategy?

Essentially the approach of these circles to the main question of the present day is dictated by an aspiration to hold on at all costs to the positions of traditional "power politics," to "register" nuclear weapons in the world permanently and to enshrine the bloc confrontation in Europe. "The government which I lead," M. Thatcher, for example, declared during her visit to Moscow, "will not forgo the security afforded our country and the whole NATO alliance by nuclear weapons." Nor is Paris prepared to forgo "power politics" cliches. J. Chirac's visit to Moscow showed that France's ruling circles see nuclear weapons not as the main threat to the continent's security but, on the contrary, as something akin to an "insurance policy" of stability and their own security. The "Charter of Principles of the Security of West Europe" put forward by the French premier at the Western European Union session is based on a continuation of the nuclear arms race into the 21st century also. The traditional "winter marathon" of NATO executive bodies held last winter in the Belgian capital and the "Brussels Declaration" adopted there testify that the thought even of a nuclear-free world is not being entertained in certain other European capitals also.

It is maintained, for example, that peace and security are ensured by a "balance of terror" based on "nuclear deterrence" and that under the conditions of the nuclear confrontation mutual deterrence contributes to the stability of the strategic situation, depriving a potential aggressor of incentives to use military force. Therefore, it is said, nuclear deterrence, "guaranteeing" the inevitability of retribution, ensures although psychologically disquieting, nonetheless physically perfectly safe living conditions.

However, upon closer examination it transpires that this "impeccable" logic is based both on a flagrant juggling of seemingly similar concepts and the absolutization of a bare theoretical outline divorced from reality.

There is no doubt that today's security derives from the dynamic balance of strategic possibilities of the USSR and the United States--a parity whereby a nuclear attack carried out with impunity is impossible. In other words, the current objective strategic situation permits the victim of nuclear aggression even under the most inauspicious conditions to preserve sufficient weapons for inflicting "unacceptable damage" on an aggressor in the course of a retaliatory strike and thus deprive him not only of the possibility of

emerging from the war the winner but also of any chance of survival.

But what is there in common between the situation which objectively exists and the "nuclear deterrence" concept built on a demonstration of a constant readiness to risk mankind's existence for the sake of maintaining the "dependability" of deterrence? In reality this concept, which lives parasitically on the objectively evolved military-strategic balance, is incompatible with the task of ensuring lasting peace and reliable security. In accordance with this logic, the "dependability of deterrence" is made dependent, first, on the capacity for inflicting on a potential aggressor "unacceptable damage" and, second, on the "persuasiveness" of the threat to use nuclear weapons.

As far as the first criterion is concerned, it is provided, it may be said, with a manifold "reserve of strength". According to available estimates, the total quantity of nuclear weapons in the world constitutes 50,000, and their total yield is the equivalent of 13 billion tons of TNT. This is a million bombs like that which destroyed Hiroshima. The simultaneous explosion even of a small part of the nuclear weapons which exist in the world would lead to the lingering radioactive contamination of huge territories and expanses of water, monstrous atmospheric pollution, a general cooling of the planet's surface, partial destruction of the stratosphere's ozone layer, a sharp increase in ultraviolet radiation disastrous for every living thing and, as a result, to the disappearance of life on Earth. Thus "nuclear deterrence" is secured today by a level of destructive power which is capable of causing "unacceptable damage" not only to an enemy but to all mankind also. Incidentally, according to the estimates of R. McNamara, the loss of 70 percent of industry and 30 percent of the population would represent "unacceptable damage" for any, even the most powerful, world power. At the present time just 5-10 percent of the strategic nuclear weapons of one of the two strongest powers is capable of inflicting such a level of losses. Nonetheless, the arms race continues, contrary to logic and commonsense.

The point being that "deterrence" is based not on criteria of "sufficiency" of nuclear potential but, on the contrary, on a colossal, unlimited surplus of destructive power. In practice the "nuclear deterrence" concept is on the pretext of satisfaction of the demands of the second criterion--the need to impart a "persuasive" nature to the threat--becoming a convenient argument for the creation of nuclear potential which ensures not only the possibility of "assured destruction" in the course of a retaliatory strike but also the capacity for fighting a nuclear war in the hope of winning it.

As a result "nuclear deterrence" is making the military-strategic balance shaky and infirm, constantly narrowing the zone of stability of strategic parity and stimulating the nuclear arms race.

But even if "nuclear deterrence" did not undermine the stability of the strategic situation, military balance could not serve as a dependable long-term, even less, the sole basis of lasting peace and international security. The sphere of stability ensured by the "symmetry of vulnerability" on which security in the world is in fact based today is not boundless. Although, as we may expect, strategic parity possesses stability within relatively wide

limits, precisely determining the boundary beyond which it loses its stabilizing function is nonetheless impossible. Therefore for the worst to happen, M.S. Gorbachev emphasizes, "it is not even necessary to perpetrate an unprecedented stupidity or crime. It is sufficient to act as we have acted for millennia--to rely in the solution of international affairs on weapons and military force and, when the opportunity arises, to use it" (2).

Nor can we agree with the arguments that nuclear weapons are an "insurance policy" of national security. Under the conditions of the global military-strategic balance between the USSR and the United States nuclear weapons located on the territory of third countries, while adding nothing to the level of their security, merely guarantee in practice the total destruction of these countries in any nuclear conflict--even if, in NATO parlance, "deterrence fails" beyond the zone of direct East-West confrontation. This could occur given the accidental outbreak of a nuclear conflict even. How can we not recall here W. Churchill's remark that "in consenting to the creation of an American base in East Anglia we have become a target, a bullseye, I would say, for the Soviet Union" (3).

Nor can nuclear weapons serve as a so-called "last resort" capable of averting defeat in a conventional conflict. Counting on this is the same as hoping to extinguish a raging fire with gasoline.

It has taken several decades to understand that victory with nuclear weapons is impossible. Will as much time be spent on recognition that self-defense with nuclear weapons is impossible also? Thus, the British Home Office estimates, Britain's "nuclear defense" could lead to the loss of 40 of the 57 million Britons (4). Can this really be called an effective strategy for safeguarding security? This is more like a plan for national suicide.

In short, the nature of modern weapons allows no state hope of safeguarding its security by such traditional means as military force. This means that peace may be lasting only if constructive coexistence and the equal and mutually profitable cooperation of states, regardless of their social system, given the total exclusion of nuclear and other types of weapon of mass extermination from the military balance, become the highest universal laws of international relations. In other words, safeguarding security increasingly appears as the task of creation on a multilateral basis of the political, material, organizational and other safeguards of the preservation of peace which preclude the very possibility of the outbreak of war. And this being so, the true source of strength in politics is the economic, scientific, intellectual and moral potential which might contribute to the accomplishment of this task.

"We need to seek a solution of all problems by mutual accommodation while remaining different," M.S. Gorbachev emphasized at the meeting with M. Thatcher in Moscow on 30 March 1987. "...And let West Europe free itself more quickly from fears in respect of the Soviet Union. It should be making a big contribution to world politics, to the international process. It has every opportunity for this." Yet stubbornly reluctant to abandon the stereotypes of thinking of the prenuclear era, the ruling circles of the leading West European states are attaching incommensurably exaggerated significance to the

military power factor. As a result the actual role precisely of the components of political power by reliance on which West Europe could realize its potential in international affairs far more fully is being devalued.

But is it just a question of the stereotypes alone? Fettering thought and holding back the process of the world's transition to political maturity, they are a kind of mirror reflection of the class interests of imperialism in the political consciousness of the West. This is why the new thinking is being impeded mainly not so much by stereotypes and not so much the sluggishness of this politician or the other but the active and conscious resistance of the forces of reaction and militarism brought about primarily by the social decrepitude of imperialism and the incapacity for realistically evaluating the world and the alternatives facing it.

II

The evaluation of the results and lessons of the meeting in Reykjavik has under current conditions become a kind of "test" of the level of realism and responsibility. With reference to European reality, a view of a Europe delivered from nuclear confrontation, in which the emergence of a new structure and new character of mutual relations between all its states would preclude the very possibility of the outbreak of war, was opened from the frontiers of the understandings agreed on there.

However, influential circles in the leadership of West European countries have been unable to fully appreciate the historic opportunity which the meeting in the Icelandic capital afforded the Old World and to move beyond the framework of old stereotypes of thinking.

Why, say, speaking about the task of reducing strategic offensive arms, are the leaders of France and Britain recalling merely the first stage providing for a 50-percent reduction in the next 5 years, completely "forgetting" about the arrangement agreed on in Reykjavik concerning their complete destruction by the end of a 10-year period. This was confirmed by French Premier J. Chirac in the course of the April negotiations in London with M. Thatcher. He declared plainly that France is not about to abandon nuclear weapons and intends developing cooperation with Britain in respect of their sophistication. In justification of such a policy the French premier declares that "peace cannot be achieved by way of unilateral disarmament." But no one is proposing this.

London also is endeavoring to distance itself from participation in the nuclear disarmament process. According to Defense Secretary G. Younger, "the acquisition of Trident missiles will be nothing other than a measure geared to maintaining the minimum level of Great Britain's deterrent force. A system with less potential would not correspond to the situation of the end of the 1980's and the subsequent period" (5). In reality, however, the measures which London plans to enhance the efficiency of its nuclear forces go beyond any conceivable "deterrence" requirements.

Endeavoring to justify its plans for a sharp buildup in nuclear power, the British leadership alludes to the area ABM system protecting Moscow authorized

by the 1972 treaty. It is maintained here that the "negligible (I--A.L.), by a factor of no more than 2.5," increase in the number of warheads is necessary for Britain to compensate for the contemplated increase in the efficiency of this system (6). However, such arguments, which are geared to an uninformed audience, do not withstand even a superficial analysis.

First of all, in the strategic respect significance is attached not so much to the figure expressing the quantity of warheads as the number and nature of the targets within their range. The 64 Polaris SLBM's fitted with 192 non-independently (as the British leadership constantly declares) targetable warheads represent a potential threat to 64 targets. But inasmuch as one SSBN is on alert status, as a rule, "deterrence," London believes, has been secured by the threat of the destruction of 16 targets. Yet acceptance of the Trident II fitted with independently targetable MARV's will lead to a broadening of the target allocation possibilities to a minimum of 512 targets (7).

The planned buildup of the "counterforce" efficiency of the British nuclear weapons is a cause for particular concern. Specialists maintain that in the plane of an increase in the efficiency of the destruction of highly protected targets a twofold increase in accuracy is the equivalent of an eightfold increase in the yield of the nuclear weapon. In this case, however, a tenfold increase in both the accuracy of the delivery vehicles and the total yield of the warheads is planned.

Nor are the references to the Soviet area AMB system convincing. If the 48 warheads of one SSBN in the patrolling zone provide, London believes, for the possibility of causing the Soviet Union "unacceptable damage," despite the existence of this system today, it is appropriate to ask: based on what efficiency of this system in the future will "modernization" be carried out? The 48 warheads constitute only 9 percent of the 512 (on four subs) which it is planned to deploy, considerably inferior to them in post-firing survivability. But even without regard for the qualitative differences, this means that Great Britain's nuclear possibilities are being planned on the basis of the repulse probability provided by the area ABM system being in excess of 0.9. But such a level of efficiency is totally unrealistic today and is not discernible in the foreseeable future.

In short, the basic parameters of the "modernization" of the British nuclear forces are no grounds for believing that London is endeavoring merely to preserve its present strategic possibilities. The same may also be said about the French nuclear rearmament program geared practically through the end of the century. It is not surprising that any antinuclear development trends cause a kind of allergy in both capitals, not to mention NATO headquarters.

This allergy is also reflected to a certain extent in the ambiguous approach of a number of West European leaders to the question of the elimination of INF in Europe, which was put on a practical footing by M.S. Gorbachev's 28 February statement. The majority of West European governments welcomed the USSR's readiness to separate the problem of INF in Europe from the Reykjavik "package" as an important initiative aimed at a lowering of the nuclear confrontation on the continent and capable of stimulating the arms control process. Thus the FRG Government declared that it approves the proposal of the

general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the conclusion with the United States of a separate agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. The Soviet proposal was approved also by other countries on whose territory the American INF are deployed (or intended for deployment) (Britain, Italy, Belgium and Holland). It elicited a positive response from official circles in other NATO states also. Following the original "supercautious" assessment of this initiative by French Foreign Minister J.-B. Raimond, President F. Mitterrand and Premier J. Chirac declared that "the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe corresponds to the interests of France and peace."

True, some "in principle" positive assessments involuntarily recall the rejoinder of former U.S. Secretary of State G. Marshall: "Each time I hear from someone the words: we agree in principle, this means they disagree with what you are saying." Such associations are not, unfortunately, without foundation if it is considered that even now many speeches of Western representatives are expressing a variety of reservations, conditions and half-hints capable of creating artificial obstacles en route to agreement. Misgivings have been expressed again and again that the elimination of Soviet and American INF on the continent might leave West Europe "defenseless" in the face of Soviet shorter-range missiles.

Highly indicative in this respect was J. Chirac's visit to the United States, at the center of the attention of which was the question of the attitude toward the Soviet proposal. Judging by Western press commentaries, in response to J. Chirac's "concern" in respect of the consequences of the elimination of INF the White House promised to act "with regard for its partners' concerns" and issued on behalf of the President a statement which moves to the forefront not the idea of a reduction in missiles but the demand for the "sanctioning" of an arms race at levels below medium-range missiles.

It is forgotten, as it were, here that, first, that American forward-based missiles, as, equally, the nuclear forces of Britain and France, would be preserved in a "defenseless" Europe. Second, M.S. Gorbachev's statement made clear mention of the elimination of Soviet and American INF in Europe and the USSR's withdrawal from the GDR and the CSSR, following agreement with the governments of these countries, of increased-range operational-tactical missiles, which were deployed there as measures in response to the deployment of the Pershing 2's and cruise missiles in West Europe. As far as other operational-tactical missiles (OTM) are concerned, the USSR proposed their elimination in Europe, and outside, dealing with them analogously to the INF, that is, limiting them to minimum agreed levels.

However odd, it was the USSR's "double zero solution" which gave rise to the active resistance of rightwing conservative forces of the West's ruling circles. Thus it took the West German leadership several months to formulate its position. When, however, at the start of June 1987, it had done so, it transpired that the consent had been hedged around with a whole number of contradictory conditions reducing to nothing the FRG's readiness to support the complete elimination of OTM in Europe on the pretext of the Warsaw Pact's "superiority" to the West in conventional arms.

There is approximate balance in terms of the numbers of the armed forces and the correlation of conventional arms between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This situation exists on the European continent also. Here NATO is superior to the Warsaw Pact in terms of the total numbers of personnel, the number of combat-ready divisions and antitank weapons and has a roughly equal amount of artillery and armored equipment. The Warsaw Pact is inferior to NATO in terms of fighter bombers, compensating for this gap by a somewhat larger number of air defense interceptor fighters.

Of course, balance does not signify complete and symmetrical equality in numbers and structure of the armed forces and the amount of divisions and arms. The armed forces of each side have developed differently, with regard for geostrategic specifics, assessments of the military-strategic situation and so forth. For this reason the purely arithmetical, oversimplified approach cannot provide a true picture. For example, there is in the NATO armed forces, aside from servicemen, a large number of civilian employees. There are 315,000 such in Great Britain alone, and in the United States, approximately 1 million. In the Warsaw Pact armies analogous duties are performed by the servicemen. The quantitative makeup of the divisions is different: the strength of a Warsaw Pact division is less than a NATO division by a factor of more than 1.5.

Taking advantage of the differences which objectively exist for the purpose of distorting the actual correlation of forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in conventional arms, Western propaganda is resorting to the outright juggling of data. Account is usually not taken here of the armed forces of France (over 500,000 men) on the pretext that it is not a part of NATO's military organization, and also of Spain (320,000 men) on the grounds that the bloc's leadership has not yet "defined the role of the Spanish armed forces". Account is taken only of the organic weapons of NATO peacetime regular forces excluding reserve components, and stored reserves, armored supplies particularly, are completely ignored.

The Warsaw Pact's forces, on the other hand, are evaluated "per the maximum". Thus upon computation of the number of army divisions even those which cannot be committed to battle without preliminary mobilization measures are included, although it is perfectly obvious that only combat-ready divisions can be compared. Attributing "aggressive designs" to the Warsaw Pact, some air defense aircraft are deliberately included in its "offensive" air potential.

In its last publication, "The Military Balance 1986-1987," the London International Institute for Strategic Studies confirms the actual existence of military balance. Thus, according to the calculations of the authors, in terms of numbers of the armed forces NATO is inferior to the Warsaw Pact in a ratio of no more than 1:1.23. There is practical equality in the numbers of ground forces--1:1.02. The tendentiousness of the procedure is manifested most graphically in the evaluation of the correlation of ground forces in Europe--1:1.46. But inasmuch as it is known that for success an attacking side needs a superiority of a minimum of three to one, the authors of the publication conclude that in Europe "the correlation of forces in terms of conventional arms makes military aggression too dangerous an undertaking for either side" (8).

British Defense Secretary G. Younger, who addressed fellows of the said institute on 19 November 1986, agreed with the data adduced in "The Military Balance". Moreover, emphasizing that "simple quantitative comparisons could be misleading," he confirmed that "the West retains technological superiority in a number of key spheres" (9). In an audience of specialists the defense secretary thereby indirectly acknowledged the existence of East-West military balance in conventional arms, whereas in public statements the reverse is maintained.

The assessment made of the Soviet statement of 28 February, which has been specified in subsequent proposals, which was positive, as a whole, implants certain hope. "We have seen that they (the West Europeans--A.L.) have understood us correctly," M.S. Gorbachev observed, "namely, we wish to purge Europe of all nuclear weapons and begin the actual process of demilitarization of the continent, holding national defense to the minimum, truly reasonable proportions on an entirely equal and honest basis" (10). However, the experience of contacts with Western powers in questions of arms limitation, as, equally, the debate which has begun in their ruling circles in connection with the Soviet initiatives, demand soberness and circumspection, the more so in that signs of a familiar game are beginning to be manifested in West European capitals: it is up to you Russians and Americans, it is said, to negotiate the elimination of your missiles and so forth, while the Americans refer to the fact that they themselves are not opposed but that it is their allies which are hesitating, and we, they say, have "Atlantic obligations". Of course, nothing good will come of it if these swings are set in motion once again.

A principal stumbling block in Reykjavik was the question of interpretation of the ABM Treaty. It was here, perhaps, that certain West European figures accomplished the most dizzying move. "The ABM Treaty makes special mention of the authorization of research in the sphere of defensive systems," British Foreign Secretary G. Howe emphasized a year ago. "It is obviously pointless attempting to impose restrictions compliance with which it is impossible to verify. A large part of the activity performed in laboratories and research institutes pertains to this category. The treaty recognizes this when it makes a distinction between research on the one hand and creation, testing and deployment on the other" (11). But when the USSR proposed recording this understanding of the treaty as the basis for strengthening its terms for the next 10 years, it turned out that London, like a number of other West European capitals also, was not ready for this.

For what are America's European allies hoping in actually pandering to the destruction of the international-law foundation of the existing edifice of stability? That Washington will, perhaps, take stock of the opinion and interests of its partners? But how it treated the SALT II Treaty--in spite of the clearly expressed opinion of its allies, incidentally--provides no grounds for such optimism.

III

Observing the rapid and contradictory development of the political situation

on the continent, one sometimes begins to doubt: what side of the Atlantic is Europe on? This, for example, is what M. Thatcher has to say: "...The free world lies on both sides of the Atlantic. On the one side, Europe, the older free world, on the other, the United States. I hope it will not be offended with me if I say that this is an overseas Europe, a fusion of European peoples overseas" (12). A curious interpretation, is it not? America, it turns out, is also Europe, but the entire socialist part of the continent, on the other hand, is not among the countries of the "free world," is situated somewhere "outside it".

But Europe is primarily the 700 million people inhabiting it belonging to opposite social systems, but united by a common continent, which has twice already been crippled by world wars and has now become a most dangerous zone of East-West military-political confrontation. More acutely aware than others of the disastrous nature of military confrontation, Europeans, regardless of whether they live in the East or West of the continent, can and must view problems of security in their way, proceeding from their own interests and their own historical experience.

An endeavor to counterpose the United States to Europe and drive wedges between Washington and its NATO allies is alien to Soviet policy. However, an essential prerequisite of the organization of a system of security which would free Europe from military confrontation is the formation of an all-European self-awareness based on a common understanding of the place and role of the continent in the solution of the cardinal question of the path along which international development will proceed--that of peace and detente or confrontation and arms race.

The further course of events will largely depend on how clearly West Europe is able to outline its positions in questions determining the fate of the entire continent. It prefers as yet to hide its face behind the veil of "Atlantic interaction". Thus the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, which met in May 1987 in Stavanger (Norway), reconfirmed the bloc's adherence to nuclear weapons. While having paid considerable attention to the question of medium-range missiles, the ministers still failed to give a constructive answer to the Soviet proposals. Such was the practical result of "Atlantic interaction".

But why does this "interaction" produce, as a rule, merely a negative result, contribute to a hardening of the line of the leading West European states and not a softening of the position of the United States and block the solution of most important problems instead of contributing to the search for solutions? Meanwhile West Europe could make a considerable contribution to a strengthening of peace and security. The United States' allies have sufficient authority and influence to adjust Washington's course in the direction of greater circumspection and correspondence to all-European interests.

The events of the mid-1980's reveal distinctly that the United States' unabashed exploitation of international tension is leading to results directly opposite to those to which Washington aspires. The danger of war is perceived more acutely and in greater relief in West Europe. The "export" from the United States of the nuclear threat, which has in recent years assumed unprecedented proportions, has made for the strengthening aspiration of a

number of West European states to distance themselves from the foreign and military policy course pursued by Washington, which is fraught with disastrous consequences. As a result a considerable expansion of the range of problems on which there are differences of opinion may be observed. They are becoming prevalent even in spheres in which, seemingly, the class solidarity of the imperialist states is manifested most fully and embracing questions which even recently were being decided unequivocally.

This trend was manifested in the practically unanimous condemnation in the West European capitals of Washington's rejection of the SALT II Treaty. It is also being revealed in the regular establishment by the small NATO countries of particular positions at the time of the adoption by the bloc's leadership of this decision or the other. The Danish Folketing's approval in March 1987 of a resolution which makes it incumbent upon the government to do everything to ensure that the big U.S. radar station located at the U.S. Air Force base in Thule (Greenland) not be used for offensive purposes and not be activated in the preparations for "star wars" may serve as a specific example.

The allies' reasonable fears of finding themselves the victims of the policy of confrontation with the socialist states being pursued by the United States, as, equally, of being pulled, contrary to their own interests and will, into the senior partner's reckless ventures outside of the "Atlantic zone, are being perceived in Washington as an expression of "neutralism" and virtually as a betrayal of the cause of "Atlantic solidarity". Whence the incessant attempts to limit the allies' freedom of choice and simultaneously tie them somewhat more tightly to itself by bonds of "nuclear safeguards" and the spurring of East-West hostility.

Yet there are in West Europe influential forces which are by no means disposed to reconcile themselves to the subordinate position in international affairs and questions of their security assigned the Europeans and do not consent to the role of "Atlantic periphery" in the military, political and economic respects. The idea of a strengthening of the "European component" of NATO and West Europe's reduced dependence on the United States based on the development of a policy in the military sphere taking European specifics into consideration to a greater extent is becoming increasingly prevalent. Thus in his new book "A Grand Strategy for the West" former FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt calls for the unity of the West European states on the basis of a Franco-West German alliance and advocates reduced reliance on nuclear weapons combined with a strengthening of the conventional armed forces and arms of NATO and a gradual withdrawal of American forces from West Europe (13). In fact Washington itself created the "vicious circle" in terms of mutual relations with its allies. The more strongly American hegemonism is manifested in transatlantic relations, the more pronounced the centrifugal trend in them becomes. This, in turn, leads to even greater pressure on the part of the United States. "The general strategy of the present U.S. Administration aimed at preservation of the postwar world positions which the United States is losing step by step," A. Yakovlev observes, "is contributing to a large extent to the exacerbation of interimperialist contradictions. Having in recent years turned the nuclear spearhead of confrontation more abruptly against the socialist system, the American ruling elite is attempting to also crush its 'class brothers' and to keep them within the framework of its economic,

military and political course" (14).

The clash of the partners' interests in questions of East-West mutual relations has always had a complex and contradictory impact on centrifugal and centripetal forces in the North Atlantic alliance. But whereas previously Washington succeeded, as a rule, in maintaining, as a whole, the stability of intrabloc relations, now the West European public is for the first time openly questioning present American policy's compatibility with the notions of its own security.

Representatives of the most diverse public strata believed that the creation of a broad-based ABM defense system with space-based components would do irreparable damage to West Europe's interests and intensify the "asymmetrical vulnerability" between the allies, which could lead to a kind of "uncoupling" on security issues, the destabilization of NATO and the need for the West European states' increased defense spending.

However, what was reflected ultimately was the rule, which is deeply rooted in West Europe's ruling circles, of according their senior partner the right to decide questions connected with security. The United States' allies are viewing the problems connected with the SDI through the prism of an East-West balance of forces which would ensure the "high reliability" of American "security guarantees". In this connection they are inclined to regard the SDI and their participation in its realization as on the one hand a means of pressure on the USSR and, on the other, as the "small change" for a linkage of questions of prevention of an arms race in space with the problem of nuclear arms limitation which would blunt the seriousness of the contradictions which exist in their relations with the United States on security issues.

Yet the United States is at this stage practically ruling out the possibility of the inclusion of the SDI on the list of "negotiable" problems within the framework of inter-allied relations. At the same time, however, Washington has succeeded in grasping the mechanisms of the political thinking of the West European establishment whose manipulation makes it possible to impress upon the allies the fact that their refusal to support the SDI will be used by the Soviet Union to sow discord between the United States and West Europe.

Such is the general background against which the approaches of individual West European countries to the problem of preventing an arms race in space and to an evaluation of the SDI are being formed. As D. Watt, former director of London's Royal Institute of International Affairs, observes, "the overpowering dependence of West Europe on security issues on the strategic potential of American deterrence is depriving it of the opportunity of opposing even the actions of the United States which could in the long term undermine the effectiveness of the American safeguards" (15).

An attempt to wheel into West Europe the Trojan Horse of the SDI for the purpose of strengthening its dominating role in NATO on the basis of an arms race and the incitement of East-West hostility precisely when a trend toward the "Europeanization" of political thinking has begun to manifest itself on the continent can also be discerned in Washington's race for military supremacy over the Soviet Union.

And it is hard to see the American plans to "supplement" the SDI by a system of "antimissile tactical defense" in West Europe other than as evidence that the Pentagon is planning to create a kind of "forward-based strategic reserve" which would "restrain" the USSR from delivering a retaliatory strike against U.S. territory in the course of a "limited" nuclear war in Europe.

Of course, now, as, incidentally, once with medium-range missiles also, the dubious laurels of initiator of the "European Defense Initiative" (EDI) are attributed to the leaders of West Europe. But in reality back in 1980, that is, long prior to the advancement of this idea, the Pentagon was speaking of plans to enhance the survivability of the new medium-range missiles thanks to the deployment of a tactical-operational missile defense (PRTD) system covering their positions. Thus using the EDI, the United States hoped to break West Europe's resistance to the American plans for the militarization of space, protect American "first strike" weapons deployed on the continent and ultimately create an additional barrier in the way of the spread of a conflict--should it begin in Europe--to U.S. territory.

As far as the overtures concerning the fact that West European corporations would receive their "share of the pie" in the form of profits from participation in the SDI are concerned, there is an explanation for these also.

Primarily, in Washington's calculations, direct contacts with West European firms are to ensure for the SDI the necessary political support and material base, which will push into the background the allies' present concerns and compel them in the future to "sanction" the United States' violation of the ABM Treaty. By the time this becomes "necessary," West European capital will be so tied up in the "star wars" preparation programs that the governments will have to consent to the policy of the development of an arms race in space.

In addition, Washington manifestly wishes to insure itself in the long term against all surprises in the event of the assumption of office of the social democrats in the FRG or the Labor Party in Great Britain. After all, both parties are opposed to the American plans for an arms race in space. As a document adopted in November 1986 by a joint working group of these parties emphasizes, they "undertake in the event of their assuming office to end government support for the SDI and participation therein."

Stimulating the transfer of government and private resources in West Europe into military R&D to the detriment of civilian programs, Washington is hoping simultaneously to slow down its competitors' economic development and help the forces of the right hold on to their political positions and weaken the circles opposed to the incitement of East-West hostility. Finally, a gamble is also being made on the fact that the competitive struggle of West European corporations for American orders will afford the United States access to the most promising studies being performed by the allies.

To where, then, is the vector of West European power turned? There is no simple answer to this question. The capitals of the West European states are not as yet, unfortunately, displaying a readiness to view the world in a new

way and embark on the path of efforts commensurate with the task currently confronting Europe--securing for all its peoples a peaceful future and prosperity. The efforts of those who see Europe's future only through the prism of the global military-political confrontation are aimed at thwarting the opportunities which have been opened to mankind for the creation of a world rid of the nuclear threat. Endeavoring to perpetuate the confrontation, they are demonstrating a lack of responsibility and an incapacity for giving a constructive answer to the questions being posed by the times.

But there are also in West Europe forces which understand that the United States' policy of destabilizing international relations is contrary to the objective interests of the European peoples. Increasingly more politicians and public figures are beginning to ponder possible political alternatives corresponding to these interests under the conditions of the growing complexity, diversity and dynamism of the modern world. The question is arising increasingly often: will not West Europe overstep that "threshold of prudence" beyond which blind trust in the United States will prove to be attended by costs which are unacceptable to it?

FOOTNOTES

1. E. Luard, "A European Foreign Policy?" (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS No 4, 1986, p 573).
2. PRAVDA, 8 February 1986.
3. HANSARD. 1950-1951. Col 630.
4. See "As Lambs to the Slaughter," London, 1981, pp 23, 127, 128.
5. THE TIMES, 8 October 1986.
6. See "Statement by Secretary of State for Defence: 1 December 1986"; "Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons," 1986, 3 December, p 998.
7. According to a special statement of the defense secretary of 1 December 1986, London "does not plan to deploy more than 128 warheads per submarine" (8 multiple reentry vehicles per SLBM), but owing to the increased range of fire, Soviet territory will be within range of all the new missiles at once, regardless of whether the submarines are in the patrolling zone or at base.
8. "The Military Balance 1986-1987," London, 1986, p 225.
9. See "Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons," 3 December 1986, p 1000.
10. PRAVDA, 22 April 1987.
11. THE TIMES, 16 March 1986.
12. THE GUARDIAN, 19 December 1985.

13. See H. Schmidt, "A Grand Strategy for the West," New Haven (Connecticut) and London, 1986.

14. KOMMUNIST No 17, 1986, p 9.

15. THE TIMES, 29 March 1985.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987

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USSR: U.S. CONTINUES TO OBSTRUCT EUROPE'S CHANCE FOR PEACE

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 6, Jun 87 pp 3-11

[Article by Yuri Lebedev and Aleksei Podberyozkin: "A Historic Chance for Europe"]

[Text] In February 1987, the Soviet Union proposed signing without delay a separate agreement on abolishing Soviet and US intermediate-range missiles (IRBMs) deployed in Europe and reducing the rest of the two countries' IRBMs sited in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and on US territory to 100 warheads. This major Soviet initiative could help march the end of the existence of a whole class of weapon—medium-range nuclear missiles—and be an important step towards a nuclear-free Europe. It could if the NATO countries were to demonstrate in practice their allegiance to the idea of eliminating nuclear weapons. "An early agreement on IRBMs," says the communique of the WTO Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, which met in Moscow late in March, "would open the road to freeing Europe from all nuclear weapons."

The problem of IRBMs is the touchstone of whether or not the West is ready to seek curbs on the arms race rather than persisting in military technological rivalry. There was no lack of assurances after Reykjavik to the effect that should the Soviet Union take this problem out of the package, there would be no difficulty in reaching agreement on abolishing the missiles. The final communique of the December 1986 Session of the North Atlantic Council, signed by *all* representatives, stressed that the alliance fully supported "the envisaged elimination of American and Soviet land-based LRINF in Europe and the limitation to 100 warheads in Asia and the United States, while their ultimate objective remains the total elimination of all such LRINF".¹ The West now has a real opportunity to prove this.

The problem of reducing IRBMs did not suddenly appear out of thin air. It has a regrettably long record marked by drama and abounding in clashes of political and military concepts and proposed solutions. A brief review of the main stages of its evolution will give the reader a clear idea of its present state and the various approaches taken to it.

A report submitted to the US Congress Foreign Affairs Committee at the height of the debate on IRBMs noted that for more than two decades, NATO policy towards using tactical nuclear weapons had been a source of contradictions and tensions in the alliance.² The report had

¹ *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, December 1986-January 1987, p. 106.

² *The Modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces Report to the Congress*, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, 1981, p. 111.

every reason for this conclusion, since throughout the postwar years Washington's nuclear status in Europe in general and in NATO in particular has bred crises and antagonisms between the allies. That status has two closely connected aspects: a foreign political one, that is, the so-called US guarantees of "defending" West European countries from "communist infiltration" (or guaranteeing, to be exact, that their social and political status quo will be unchanged), and a military political one, i. e., actual, not merely declared, plans for the use of the European continent by Washington as a bridgehead against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the event of war. And while the US "nuclear guarantees" are justly regarded as non-committal, plans for war on European soil have been seen as actual US policy ever since the end of the Second World War.

Due to Washington's reliance in the early postwar years on the nuclear bomb as the principal means of solving most of foreign political problems, Western Europe was the first external region where US nuclear weapons were stationed. There were several reasons for this. The United States wanted even then to use West Europeans for the hegemonistic and ambitious aims of the imperialist foreign policy, or, in other words, to use Western Europe as a new theatre of war. From the point of view of military technology, Washington needed the resources of Western Europe but above all else the military bases close to Soviet borders. The range of B-29 bombers, which at that time were the only means of delivering nuclear bombs, did not exceed 4,000 km, and they could therefore reach the Soviet Union solely from bases in Western Europe. The only opportunity for trying to blackmail the Soviet Union before the United States fielded the strategic B-52 bomber in 1955 had been to use such bases.

As far back as July 1948, two groups of US B-29 bombers equipped with atom bombs were delivered to Europe. They were stationed in Britain according to the "forward defence" strategy evolved at the time, which provided for military operations against the Soviet Union as far east as possible. Launching nuclear strikes against major Soviet political, economic and military centres from West European territory was considered an earnest of victory in a future war. Documents of the Pentagon indicate that the Soviet Union was planned to be reduced to "a smoking radiating ruin at the end of two hours".³ This strategic plan underlay the doctrine of "massive retaliation", which made nuclear blackmail the bedrock of US foreign policy.

To accomplish the tasks set, the United States started an unprecedented arms race on two main lines: the construction of strategic aircraft and the rapid buildup of atomic and subsequently nuclear explosive charges.

In the late 1940s and, indeed, the early 1950s, the United States, having massed bombing aircraft and huge stocks of nuclear arms at its West European bases and along the Soviet frontier, had reason to expect that in the event of war it would be able to limit the conflict to the European continent. In that period, known as the period of "US nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union", there existed, nonetheless, no overall US military superiority. The Soviet Union, which had set up an air-defence system and had ground forces wielding considerable strength, was by no means a weak opponent of Washington, and as for the outcome of a future war, it was in no way predetermined by the nuclear superiority of the United States. However, the territory of the United States proper was immune at the time to retaliation from the Soviet Union.

³ *Living with Nuclear Weapons*, New York-London, 1983, p. 80.

The situation began changing in the second half of the 1950s, when the Soviet Union attained its own means of nuclear weapons delivery. The change went further in the late 1950s, after a series of successful intercontinental ballistic missile tests by the Soviet Union.

With the vulnerability of the United States to Soviet retaliation growing, the US rulers aspired more and more to ensure that future hostilities were confined within the geographical bounds of Europe.

Due to the increasing vulnerability of the United States, that country's rulers set out to build a "minor nuclear war" capability. The US nuclear arsenal in Western Europe grew as follows: in May 1953, the first US tactical nuclear charge was tested; in the autumn of 1953, it was officially announced that the first six 280-mm guns firing nuclear shells were being shipped to Europe; on January 15, 1954, Air Force Secretary Talbot announced that two batteries of Matador guided missiles carrying nuclear warheads to a distance of 1,000 km were being shipped to Europe; the Matadors were followed by Honest John missiles with a range of 25 to 30 km; late in 1954, a battalion of Corporal guided missiles (range over 50 miles) arrived in Western Europe; in March 1956, several batteries of Honest John missiles and six battalions of atom guns were shipped to the same destination; in the spring of 1959, the United States began to deploy, under the guise of tactical weapons, 60 Thor missiles in Britain and 45 Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey, that is, missiles capable of destroying targets in western areas of the Soviet Union.

In 1952, Britain tested its nuclear weapon, and in 1955 bombers of the V type were put on combat duty. Under a British-US agreement signed at Nassau in 1962, Britain also got Polaris SLBMs. Somewhat later France, for its part, built up its nuclear capability, which in 1964 included 50 nuclear-capable Mirage IV aircraft. At around the same time (late 1950s-early 1960s), plans were made for the formation of independent and multinational NATO nuclear forces; they were viewed with extreme displeasure by the United States.

The NATO countries have repeatedly modernised their intermediate-range nuclear potential; they have done so in recent years and are doing it now. According to foreign press reports, the nuclear capability of the armed forces of France alone increased in the 1975-1980 period from 30 to 70 megatons; by the late 1990s, Britain and France will have 2,000 nuclear charges. It follows that NATO's nuclear policy has a record bristling with contradictions between its protagonists.

At the turn of the 1980s, the problem of intermediate-range nuclear weapons became the central international and military problem of East-West relations as well as relations between the United States and its West European allies. It assumed a special complexion after the December 1979 session of NATO took a decision to deploy new US IRBMs—108 Pershing-2 and several hundred cruise missiles—in five West European countries. These missiles differ substantially from the US nuclear weapons deployed earlier in Western Europe. The fundamental difference between the old and new missiles is that the new systems are highly accurate and virtually undetectable until they are very near to the target.⁴

The NATO decision is provocative, for it enables the United States to launch a preventive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union and its allies. The *SIPRI Yearbook* (the yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), a very informative publication, noted: "If it is deployed in Europe, the Pershing II will be one of the most capable

⁴ CEP (circular error probable) is 20 to 40 m in the case of Pershing-2 and less than 80 m in that of cruise missiles (as against 400 m in the case of Pershing-1). Pershing-2 reaches the target in 8 to 10 minutes. The cruise missile takes longer but as it has a small reflecting surface and flies at an altitude of less than 100 m, it is practically undetectable before it appears over the target.

counterforce weapons in the US arsenal. It is ideal for use against time-urgent targets such as command, control and communications centers, missiles, quick-reaction alert aircraft and submarines in part."⁵ L. V. Sigal, a US scientist, admits that Pershing-2 possesses sufficient speed and accuracy to destroy a large number of Soviet combat control systems.

He believes that "With C³ knocked out (combat control systems—*Auths*), the USSR might be unable to mount a coordinated counter-attack, and the remaining missiles would be vulnerable to further US attacks".⁶ Would this be why some NATO people have so strong a predilection for the new US IRBMs.

At present the United States has 380 IRBMs in Western Europe (108 Pershing-2 and 272 cruise missiles). Opposing these missiles and the nuclear forces of Britain and France are 355 Soviet IRBMs (243 SS-20s and 112 SS-4s). Besides, Europe has a large stockpile of other nuclear weapons that would destroy all life on the continent if used. Worthy of note in this connection is the attitude of former US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who justly criticises the doctrine of waging a nuclear war in Europe, and the policy which has resulted in the stockpiling of several thousand rounds of nuclear ammunition on the continent. Referring to vast research, he shows that a nuclear war could not be limited. Nevertheless, as McNamara, who certainly knows the facts, points out, NATO strategy is still based on the threat of a nuclear first strike.

There are good reasons to feel apprehensive. The new NATO concept, Air Land Battle-2000, envisages delivering a combined preemptive strike with nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons against WTO countries. The main vehicles which NATO would expect to use for this are IRBMs with nuclear and chemical warheads.

The Soviet Union was understandably compelled to respond to all the US preparations endangering it. Safeguarding the national security of the state is a natural right of any country treasuring its independence and sovereignty. This explains why the Soviet Union developed and then modernised a potential commensurate to the imperialist challenge in Europe. It deployed nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles in the 1950s, that is, after the United States had. In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union put on combat duty missiles known in the West as SS-4 and SS-5; for nearly two decades they counterbalanced the threat coming from the United States and other NATO countries. Afterwards, when the missiles became inoperable, they gradually gave way to the more modern SS-20 IRBMs, as was only natural in view of the accelerating modernisation of similar weapons by the United States and its allies.

Incidentally, the Soviet Union called repeatedly for the destruction of not only the IRBMs but the tactical missiles deployed by both sides in Europe. During the talks on SALT-1 and SALT-2, the USSR proposed discussing the problem of US forward based weapons; it was in response to these weapons that the Soviet Union had built up its nuclear capability in Europe. Later on, in October 1979, the Soviet side declared that it was willing to consider the question within the framework of SALT-3 talks and to reduce its IRBMs unilaterally provided no further intermediate-range weapons were deployed in Western Europe.⁷

⁵ S. Lodgaard, "Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces"—*SIPRI Yearbook 1983*, London, 1983, p. 3.

⁶ *Nuclear Strategy and World Security*, London, 1985, p. 213.

⁷ *Как устранить угрозу Европе*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1983, p. 49.

But Washington evaded discussion. Its would-be excuses are well known. The actual reason for the US refusal was its plans for replacing the Thor, Jupiter and Matador missiles stationed in Europe by new IRBMs, for already in 1967 NATO decided to deploy the latter in Europe.

It would be utterly naive to imagine that the absence of Soviet SS-20 missiles would have prevented NATO from implementing its plans. True, the United States seized on the siting of SS-20s as a pretext for deploy-

ing Pershing-2 and cruise missiles. However, we know from history that whenever necessary, Washington contrives to find an excuse for stepping up the arms race—one has only to recall the talk about the missile gap under John F. Kennedy or the "window of vulnerability" under Jimmy Carter, not to mention numerous other cases in point. Nor is there the slightest justification for Washington's decision to ignore SALT-2 or its questioning of the ABM Treaty and level all sorts of unfounded accusations against the Soviet Union. The US administration has never been deterred by a lack of pretexts for breaking its commitments or for trying to prove that there was a "Soviet military threat". It simply invents a pretext each time it needs one. And it did just that with reference to the threat posed by the SS-20s.

The new Soviet missiles did not alter the strategic balance in Europe; still less did they present an additional threat to the United States. Their range is the same as before and as for the number of missiles and their aggregate nuclear yield, they have even decreased. To be sure, they are more sophisticated than the SS-4 or SS-5, but then the United States has been steadily modernising its forward-based means, and this also applies to NF of Britain and France. As a result, by the time the Soviet Union began deploying its new IRBMs, NATO had considerably increased its nuclear capability since the early 1960s.

In December 1982, the Soviet Union signified its readiness to unilaterally reduce hundreds of missiles, keeping only as many of them as Britain and France had. It indicated that it would reduce its nuclear weapons in proportion to cuts in similar British and French NF.

Still greater opportunities of limiting the arms race in this field were provided by the proposals set out in Mikhail Gorbachev's statement on January 15, 1986. These expressed readiness to seek agreement on IRBMs in Europe in order to eliminate all Soviet and US missiles as a first step towards freeing the continent from nuclear weapons.

It is important to note that the Soviet Union backed up its proposals with concrete moves to ease nuclear confrontation in Europe. In April 1985, the Soviet Union unilaterally suspended the deployment of its missiles and the adoption of other countermeasures in Europe, which it had proceeded to do after the deployment of US intermediate-range missiles began there. It removed from combat duty the SS-20 missiles sited after June 1984, and their number—243—has not increased since then. Last but not least, the Soviet Union maintained a unilateral moratorium on nuclear blasts from August 6, 1985 to February 1987.

The Soviet proposals at Reykjavik opened up far-reaching prospects for nuclear disarmament. They were unprecedented in scope and boldness as a move in favour of eliminating nuclear weapons. Casting aside the "mothballed assortment" of the Geneva talks, the Soviet Union took a whole number of constructive steps. For instance, it withdrew the question of US forward-based nuclear weapons capable of striking Soviet territory. It agreed to reduce the strategic triad—ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers—by at least 50 per cent towards the end of 1991 on the understanding that by late 1996 these armaments would be abolished altogether.

As for IRBMs, the Soviet Union agreed to all Soviet and US IRBMs in Europe being eliminated, with the nuclear capability of Britain and France left aside. The number of missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km would be frozen, and the number of warheads on IRBMs which the Soviet Union could have in Asia and the United States on its national territory would not exceed 100.

In proposing these compromises, the Soviet Union was entitled to expect that Washington would refrain from attempts to gain strategic superiority in other fields of the arms race, as, for instance, by plans for developing space strike weapons and deploying them in near-Earth space. This is why it suggested that the sides pledge of their own free will not to exceed the ABM Treaty (signed for an indefinite term) for ten years and to respect it unfailingly.

No agreement on these issues, whose solution was suggested "in package", was reached at Reykjavik through the fault of the United States, although the US side accepted the Soviet proposals on strategic armaments and IRBMs.

The Soviet leadership's next step—the separation of the problem of IRBMs in Europe from the Reykjavik package now being discussed at Geneva—was all the more important. This decision was certainly not easy to make, especially in view of the escalation of the nuclear weapons race by the United States. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union made it. The action was not a sign of weakness, as the West occasionally affirms, but was prompted by a keen sense of responsibility for the destiny of the world and by an awareness of the great urgency of curbing the arms race.

Regrettably, it is not only in the United States that one hears allegations about the Soviet Union giving in to the West's pressure but in some other countries whose leaderships know well that no amount of pressure, let alone blackmail, can force the Soviet Union into compromising, for compromises require Soviet goodwill.

What, then, is the purpose of would-be analytical conclusions made in the West about the changes in the Soviet position on IRBMs? Those who make them apparently want to delay agreement (which is within reach), hoping to "wrest something more" from the Soviet Union and ultimately to torpedo agreement. Secondly, they would clearly like to give credit for a positive outcome to the "firmness" of the US President and the West as a whole in order to justify the stance of those influential quarters in the United States and Western Europe whose policy of stepping up the arms race is discrediting itself more and more in the eyes of the world public.

This must be the reason why Senator Robert Dole, for one, said the Soviets had made it clear that they really wanted a separate accord on INF, except that they had yet to *prove* it. What more proof does the United States want? After all, the Soviet Union made very serious concessions, as is evident, in order to break the deadlock at the talks, concessions which the United States may not have expected at all proposing its "zero option". This is suggested by Les Aspin, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the US House of Representatives. Speaking to Congress, he said the "zero option" advanced by the United States in 1981 had not been conceived as a basis for agreement. It has been put forward with the purely propagandistic aim of abating the wave of actions in Europe against intermediate-range missiles and showing flexibility. Renouncing it would be nothing particular. There had been earlier instances of the US administration going back on its own proposals. By making this amazingly cynical admission, the US politician virtually

reserved for the US side the right to renounce its own proposal should the Soviet side accept it. Worse still, he justified a possible decision in this sense by saying that the US side had done it before.

Thus two leading Republicans in the US Congress representing both Houses have intimated that a Soviet acceptance of what is, in fact, a US plan for the solution of the problem of IRBMs would by no means guarantee realisation of the plan. New demands may be made in addition to or instead of it, demands which may be followed by further ones, according to the US side's logic and its practice of going back on its

own promises. Is this what the two members of Congress had in mind?

Whether the United States is going to block the new Soviet proposal, which paves the way for curbing the arms race in other directions as well, is probably one of the most important questions today. Its solution hinges on numerous factors, especially two of them as we see it.

First, there is the US rulers' bid to escalate the arms race qualitatively and achieve military technological superiority. So far they have treated implementation of the latest technological and military programmes for the development and stationing of weapons as an absolute priority. A US magazine commented in an editorial that "America can look with pride on the initial successes of this programme" (of strategic rearmament—*Auths.*).⁸ It is to such programmes that the process of limiting the arms race has been sacrificed until now. Can the United States overcome its disastrous inertia? Success in reaching agreement will depend primarily on this.

Second, there is a growing dissatisfaction with this policy in the United States itself. This, too, is a factor which Washington must reckon with. The administration must heed both the mood of the American public and the position of West European countries, and it must not forget that it would lose face if it refuses to seek a solution. In other words, there are some indications that the administration may find itself compelled to accept a solution of the IRBMs issue. Time will show which of the two trends prevails.

However, Washington will undoubtedly try to present unacceptable conditions and drag its feet at the talks, which means that they might break down, with the US side refusing to seek agreement or trying to impose a spurious solution.

This is precisely how one should regard, for instance, the plans to preserve cruise missiles after their removal from Western Europe, or changing the Pershing-2 ballistic missile into its single-stage version, Pershing-1B. In both cases the threat to Europe actually remains.

All kinds of strings attached to the solution of the medium-range missile issue in the West, whether it is "tied in" with the problem of enhanced-range tactical missiles, of conventional weapons and armed forces, or the verification problem, should be viewed in the same way. In all these and in other cases the aim is most unseemly—deliberately to obstruct, or even to prevent, the reaching of understanding on removing medium-range missiles from Europe, which is a most important issue today. One of the main tasks now is to prevent the opponents of understanding from doing so. This is why a new move was made recently to give a fresh impact to disarmament efforts.

To facilitate the reaching of an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe without delay, Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech in Prague has proposed that the sides should begin to discuss the reduction and subsequent destruction of missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometres dep-

⁸ *Air Force Magazine*, November 1986, p. 6.

loyed on the continent of Europe. And this problem should not be tied in with the solution of the medium-range missile problem. The ultimate goal of such discussion should be a radical reduction and complete elimination of the enhanced-range tactical missiles in Europe. For the time of the talks the sides should commit themselves not to increase the number of this type of missiles.

Irrespective of the course of discussion over the issue of enhanced-range tactical missiles, after the agreement on medium-range missiles is signed, the Soviet Union, in agreement with Czechoslovakia and the GDR, is prepared to remove from these countries the missiles which were deployed in response to the deployment of new American medium-range missiles.

The new Soviet proposals advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev during his discussion with George Shultz on the entire set of problems connected with nuclear and space weapons, particularly medium-range missiles in Europe, provide even greater possibilities for reaching agreements. In the course of the meeting with the US Secretary of State, Mikhail Gorbachev expressed readiness to include in an agreement on medium-range missiles the Soviet commitment to totally eliminate, over a short time period, its enhanced-range tactical missiles and begin eliminating tactical battlefield missiles. This new initiative opens up the possibility for making a cardinal change in international relations.

It is evident, however, that, apart from medium-range and enhanced-range tactical missiles, high concentration of tactical nuclear weapons and also conventional arms and armed forces exist in Europe and are being constantly augmented. In recent years the number of these weapons and their quality have been greatly increased. The implementation of the Budapest programme of the Warsaw Treaty nations in which it is proposed that issues of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons be solved together with tactical nuclear means, represents a major step towards ending the arms race. It has been therefore proposed that all European states, as well as the USA and Canada, should pool their efforts and start large-scale talks to achieve a radical reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, the armed forces and conventional arms. At these talks the sides could also discuss priority measures on lowering the level of military confrontation and preventing the threat of a surprise attack, and also measures on a mutual withdrawal of most dangerous offensive arms from the zone of direct contact of the two military alliances.

The creation of nuclear-free zones and zones cleared of chemical weapons would help strengthen European security. The USSR has backed up the appeal of the governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia to the FRG government, in which they have proposed the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe; the Soviet Union has also expressed its preparedness to withdraw from this zone all Soviet nuclear weapons: mines, missiles, projectiles, including the nuclear-capable aircraft of the tactical strike air force and also nuclear-capable anti-aircraft missile units. Furthermore, the creation of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons on the Balkans and in northern Europe, and also the creation in Europe of a zone of greater confidence and reduced armaments, as was proposed by Poland, would be of great significance.

It is clear that the implementation of these proposals will require most radical inspection measures. Moreover, since it has come to the elimination of entire classes of weapons, the verification problem acquires a new dimension—it is the demand of the time and a major means of guaranteeing security. Therefore the USSR has come out for the strictest measures in this area, including on-site inspection, which should extend not only to the remaining missiles and launching units, but to all other facilities, namely: testing grounds, arms manufacturing works, training centres, and so on.

In this way the USSR has again displayed its preparedness boldly to agree to a limitation and destruction of nuclear arsenals and showed determination to overcome the obstacles erected on this path by certain forces in the West.

Another important aspect of the problem, whose solution Mikhail Gorbachev proposed on February 28 this year, is that the separation of the problem of IRBMs from the package discussed at Reykjavik does not at all imply that the other problems—limiting offensive strategic armaments and preventing the deployment of space strike weapons—could likewise be settled piecemeal.

As for the connection between offensive strategic weapons and anti-ballistic missile defence, it is there objectively. This was recognised in the past by the US side as well, and it underlies the 1972 ABM Treaty. There is no severing this objectively existing connection without injuring the security of one or the other side. Hence the Soviet demand that renunciation by both sides of the development and deployment of ABM national territory systems be crucial for reducing and abolishing strategic offensive armaments. "Of course," Mikhail Gorbachev said in his statement on February 28, 1987, "the conclusion of such an agreement (on abolishing strategic armaments—*Auths.*), ... should be dependent on a decision to prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space, in view of the organic interconnection of these issues."

It follows that should the United States set out to establish an ABM system of its territory, this would mean torpedoing both the ABM Treaty and the process of limiting the nuclear arms race.

Needless to say, solution of the problem of IRBMs will not depend exclusively on the Soviet Union and its willingness to seek compromises and ways out. In recent years the USSR has repeatedly furnished proof of its readiness to search for mutually acceptable solutions. The United States, however, has so far taken no real steps in this direction. Moreover, as Mikhail Gorbachev stated during his talks with George Shultz, at every our step it responded by attempts to complicate, and even disrupt the whole business, or at best by dragging its feet while waiting for us to take new steps.

The Soviet proposals offer an opportunity for proceeding to free Europe from the huge stockpiles of weapons and to provide conditions for building a nuclear-free world. This historic chance must not be missed.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS ON U.S. SENATE DELEGATION VISIT

Dobrynin, Cranston on Missiles

LD201455 Moscow TASS in English 1450 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS -- Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoliy Dobrynin has received Alan Cranston, deputy Democratic majority leader in the U.S. Senate, at the latter's request.

In a talk, marked by a goodwill spirit, the sides focused their attention on a wide range of international and bilateral issues, crucial for improving the situation in the world and normalising Soviet-American relations. The agreement on eliminating Soviet and American medium- and shorter-range missiles would have been a major step towards that goal. In that connection mutual concern was expressed over the FRG's striving to preserve on its territory Pershing-1A missiles with American nuclear warheads.

Note was taken of the growing role of parliamentary ties in improving the relations between the two countries in a search for ways to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war.

Anatoliy Dobrynin and Alan Cranston agreed that it was important not to lose the real opportunities that are opening now for a turn in international relations in the interests of creating a safer and more stable peace.

Senator Alan Cranston stated that the USA showed great interest in ongoing perestroika in the USSR, in the philosophy of new thinking in international politics and in Mikhail Gorbachev's innovative activities.

IZVESTIYA on News Conference

PM211145 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Aug 87 Morning Edition p 4

[A. Kuvshinnikov report: "Difficult But Useful Dialogue" under rubric "From Our Correspondent at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Excerpts] The positions of the USSR and the United States are a considerable distance apart in many political spheres. To try to reduce this distance, we must first clarify the essence of the U.S. view of various international problems. The news conference given by members of the U.S. Senate delegation in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet primarily serves this aim.

Anticipating journalists' questions, D. Moynihan, head of the delegation, emphasized that he is satisfied with the full conversations he has had in Moscow in which the sides discussed international aspects of the USSR's economic restructuring policy and many foreign policy problems. The Soviet representatives, Moynihan stressed, have shown a willingness to discuss any subject, including topics considered sensitive by one or both sides.

The attitudes of this group of highly representative senators merit more detailed attention. The first issue is their attitude towards the 72 U.S. warheads for the West German Pershing-1A operational and tactical missiles. Senator Moynihan made it perfectly clear that the United States does not intend to discuss the question of these warheads at talks on the "global double-zero option." That is, it considers the formula whereby the United States would retain the above 72 warheads if the Soviet Union completely eliminates its operational and tactical missiles to be fair. From its standpoint, the equation "0 equals 72" at least makes political sense if not mathematical sense.

A correspondent from a Czechoslovak news agency asked about the possibility of USSR-U.S. joint action to settle regional conflicts.

There is an understanding on the whole, Senator P. Sarbanes replied, that it would be expedient to pool our efforts to prevent any further increase in tension. But at present, Senator T. Sanford added, we are still very wary of one another. What is more, it must be taken into account that in certain instances the two sides' interests may diverge considerably, which makes cooperation more difficult.

Summing up the results of the news conference, Senator Sarbanes noted that, despite the differences in the two sides' approaches that had been apparent during the talks in Moscow, the fact of the dialogue and the exchange of opinions were useful in themselves. This is because they reflect the desire to clearly establish the other side's views, without which it is impossible to even attempt to bring their positions closer. While agreeing with this assessment, it should still be borne in mind that any rapprochement and willingness to compromise must be mutual.

Visit Concludes 23 Aug

LD231256 Moscow TASS in English 1133 GMT 23 Aug 87

[Text] Leningrad August 23 TASS -- The U.S. Senate delegation (three Democrats and one Republican) have completed their official visit to the Soviet Union today. The trip was made at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Following meetings in Moscow, the guests spent two days in Leningrad.

The leader of the U.S. delegation, Daniel Moynihan, in a reply speech at an official dinner given by the city authorities in honour of the delegation said that "During World War Two our two countries were allies. We are aware that we can be allies in peace time as well." He also pointed out that the interests of the common cause presupposed greater frankness and openness between the two countries. The senator is of the opinion that the U.S. Senate delegation's visit, just as a Soviet parliamentary delegation's reply visit to the USA, should promote the attainment of this goal.

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CSO: 5200,1643

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: NATO SEEKS REARMAMENT, NOT DISARMAMENT

LD201941 Moscow TASS in English 1902 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

At a time when the world public is looking at Geneva where conditions have been created thanks to the Soviet side's constructive, dynamic stance for concluding an agreement on scrapping all Soviet and American medium- and shorter-range missiles, a first step in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, there has emerged fresh evidence that NATO is preparing dangerous "surprises" for Europe.

The Soviet-American agreement has not as yet been elaborated, but the North Atlantic alliance is already looking for loopholes which would allow circumvention of the agreement, and is taking measures to reduce it to naught.

The Pentagon chief, Caspar Weinberger, presented at the recent session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group an assortment of new weaponry systems allegedly required by the West should the "zero-zero" option become a reality.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. John Galvin of the U.S. said that the "deterrence potential" would be preserved if NATO improved the situation with airborne nuclear weapons.

Britain's Defence Secretary George Younger made it clear that new American nuclear delivery vehicles could be deployed on British territory.

Any "zero option" needs a replacement, that is rearmament -- such is the creed of those who advocate the preservation of nuclear weapons on both sides of the Atlantic.

What do the NATO plans of so-called compensation for the reduction of nuclear arms in Europe provide for?

Aren't these plans just a trick designed to deceive the Soviet Union?

Firstly, they provide for the deployment of additional nuclear-capable F-111 fighter bombers on the British Isles.

Washington seems to be insisting on the deployment of these aircraft on the territories of other Western European NATO countries as well.

Incidentally, Norway's Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland said the other day that her government refused to provide bases on Norwegian territory for U.S. F-111 fighter bombers.

Secondly, a possibility of deploying nuclear-armed FB-111A medium bombers in some Western European NATO countries, including Britain, is being considered.

It has been proposed to arm F-4 fighter bombers, based in Europe, with shorter-range cruise missiles.

Thirdly, it has been proposed to deploy sea-based cruise missiles under the control of the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

This option providing for Britain becoming a base for cruise-armed submarines, Younger put it bluntly, figured in all papers in potential measures to fill in the blanks in NATO's "forces of nuclear deterrence."

Fourthly, options are being considered for establishing bases for B-52 bombers armed with airborne cruise missiles in Britain, Spain or Turkey.

Finally, a possibility of the broad introduction of land-based "non-nuclear" cruise missiles in Europe is being examined.

The assortment is indeed very wide: what is offered instead of a real reduction in the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe is large-scale unilateral rearmament on the part of NATO.

Only bitter cynics could describe as a genuine disarmament agreement the treaty on scrapping medium- and shorter-range missiles if the NATO countries approve the recommendations on deploying "compensatory" systems of nuclear weapons.

NATO's unilateral rearmament would simply alter the character of nuclear confrontation, rather than really reduce its level in Europe.

All these facts can hardly attest to the sincerity of U.S. and other NATO officials who speak of the possibility of reaching an agreement in Geneva in the near future.

There will be no agreement unless an obstacle is erected in the way of the far-reaching plans of the NATO military to gain unilateral advantages for the North Atlantic bloc at the negotiating table.

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CSO: 5200/1643

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: PERSHING 1-A MISSILES REMAIN 'HOT' ISSUE

FRG Stance Impedes Agreement

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 18 Aug 87 pp 1-4

[Untitled article by Novosti political correspondent Enver Mamedov under the rubric "News and Views."]

[Text] West German Bundestag deputy Hermann Scheer believes the FRG Government must without delay agree to elimination of Pershing 1-A missiles, writes NOVOSTI political correspondent Enver Mamedov. Otherwise, it would torpedo the signing of a Soviet-American agreement on the abolition of two whole classes of missiles--medium- and shorter-range ones. The same view is shared by most of Scheer's colleagues from the parliamentary Social-Democratic Party of Germany. Most West German Social-Democrats are insisting that the Bundestag be specially reconvened before the end of its summer recess if the Kohl cabinet fails to meet half way the opposition demands and ignores European public opinion. The Bonn-Washington knot is indeed tight. The 72 missiles--1-A's--are in the hands of the West German authorities, while the 72 nuclear warheads for them are controlled by the American armed forces. Now that it is urgently imperative to finalise the text of an agreement on abolition of all Soviet and American medium- and shorter-range missiles everywhere, these 72 Pershings seem suspended in mid-air. The Americans consider the warheads, and Bonn the missiles for these warheads as their property.

To questions not only of the Soviet Union, but also of many countries, including NATO ones, about who is the owner of these nuclear-tipped missiles or who decides on their launching--neither Washington nor the Kohl cabinet give any coherent answer. Their departments and the press, on the quiet and sometimes openly, try to condition the public to the idea that these 72 armed missiles belong to a mythical third force or are all but the common property of the armed forces of the two countries. But that is so much nonsense. A nuclear missile has only one owner, one superior commander who is responsible for the survival or destruction of mankind.

The owners of the 72 nuclear warheads being stored for the Bundeswehr Pershings by the Americans are of course the Americans themselves. Incidentally, high-ranking U.S. officials and top military commanders have repeatedly stated that the main thing is the nuclear warheads and the secondary the delivery vehicles.

And here we come to the central point: transfer by the U.S. armed forces of 72 Pershing 1-A missiles to the Bundeswehr (though both Bonn and Washington make assurances that the warheads are controlled by the Americans) is a direct violation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty of 1 July, 1968. The preamble to the treaty emphasises that the spreading of nuclear weapons seriously enhances the danger of nuclear war and threatens to destroy mankind.

For this reason, having passed on Pershing 1-A missiles to the West German army, the U.S. grossly breached Article 1 of the treaty, which prohibits the nuclear-weapon powers to transfer such weapons to others in whatever form or as nuclear explosive devices. The same article bans control (which means prohibiting a nuclear power passing the second key to a non-nuclear one). States not possessing nuclear weapons are forbidden to acquire any devices that could help them deliver such weapons. On this point, too, with Pershing 1-A's passed on to Bonn, both the U.S. and West Germany grossly violated the treaty.

Special attention attaches to Article 2 of the Treaty. It is worth quoting in full: "Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty (the FRG is a Party—E.M.) undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferrer whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices."

It could not have been stated more explicitly. Pershing 1-A or its versions are delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons and their warheads. By accepting 72 such vehicles from the U.S., the FRG did not take them to mount in museums, but for training and activation purposes. If even this is not clear, it is enough to turn to Article 6 of the Treaty. The article reads that every Party to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Thus, the United States, in entering into collusion and acting in concert with the FRG, once again grossly breaches its obligations under the existing nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

It can safely be guessed that this is only the tip of the iceberg of the strategic designs of the U.S. and its NATO partners. The ultimate goal is to draw the FRG into the nuclear club. (Though Bonn weakly denies this.) If this happens—that is, if the FRG joins the nuclear club, it would be difficult to predict all the consequences of that dangerous step. Already a whole number of states, chiefly allies or vassals of the United States, possess, through its help, the technology and particularly complex elements necessary for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. We may include among them South Africa, Israel and Pakistan. But the United States is either silent or dismissive when attempts are made to put a stop to these illegal moves.

Soviet public opinion is alarmed by the play of the U.S. and the FRG around the 72 Pershing 1-A's. Each such toy contains warheads with the explosive power many times over that of the bombs that incinerated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The U.S. and the FRG must answer the question of who owns the 72 combat Pershing 1-A missiles and when they will be phased out if an agreement on a global double zero is concluded, or, in other words, must finally and without delay go over from evasive tricks to fair play.

(APN, August 14. In full.)

On Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting

LD2101414 Moscow TASS in English 1405 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS -- A correspondent of the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT asked Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, at a briefing here today whether the meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, slated for Washington in mid-September, would be held.

"When we agreed with the American side about the meeting, the point at issue was that diplomats from the two countries will work hard to prepare the meeting properly so that it yield a result.

This implies, primarily, the need to adopt a decision on the problem of West German Pershing-1A missiles and American warheads to them, which is a touchstone showing the American side's desire to reach an agreement."

"As all signs indicate," the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said, "the American diplomats are in a holiday mood and they do not offer proposals that could help settle the problem.

There is, therefore, a doubt as to what we will have by September, by the time of the meeting. What the Soviet minister will have to offer and, in turn, what the U.S. secretary of state will be able to say in reply. [sentence as received]

The meeting should be better prepared," Gerasimov said. "At present, no proper effort are being done for that."

Washington's Inflexibility

LD201532 Moscow TASS in English 1510 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS -- Washington's inflexible and obviously destructive position nullifies its assertions that a "double-zero option" would make it possible to finalize a draft treaty on the problem, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov said here today.

Speaking at a briefing for Soviet and foreign correspondents, Gerasimov, who heads the ministry's Information Directorate, said that over the past month the U.S. delegation

had not made a single specific proposal for speeding work even on such an advanced problem as that of eliminating medium-range and shorter-range missiles.

"Moreover, it has been avoiding finding a solution to remove what is a major stumbling block at the talks -- the issue of scrapping U.S. nuclear warheads for West German Pershing-1A shorter-range missiles," he added.

The U.S. delegation, the Soviet spokesman said, had not responded to this day to a Soviet proposal for a phased elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles, a proposal which had taken into account the interests of both sides.

"Neither has the American [side] been active in coming to terms on also other outstanding issues," he continued.

That, Gerasimov added, "Can hardly testify to an interest in the productivity of the future meeting of the foreign ministers of the USSR and the United States and this cannot but arouse concern, especially considering the short time remaining before the meeting."

The Western press had reported that, in view of the possible treaty on medium-range and shorter-range missiles, NATO circles were studying options for "compensating" deployments of American nuclear arms, he said.

That included moving a significant number of F-111 and FB-111 planes to Britain and re-aiming part of the Poseidon warheads on U.S. submarines to zero in on targets now covered by Pershing-1's and cruise missiles, among other possibilities, Gerasimov said.

"Talking about any compensation is absurd. The medium-range and shorter-range missiles under the proposal being discussed are to be scrapped by two sides -- the Soviet Union and the United States.

"If these plans are really adopted, it would be more correct to speak not of compensation but of a unilateral buildup.

"It is in effect the same idea of "zero plus", which the U.S. and the F.R.G. are now pushing in relation to the 72 American warheads for West German Pershing-1A missiles. the zero is meant for East, while the zero plus 72 for West," Gerasimov explained.

Kohl Remarks on Pershing 1-A

LD221526 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 22 Aug 87

[Text] Chancellor Helmut Kohl has stated that the FRG Government does not intend to give up the Pershing-1A missiles with U.S. nuclear warheads. In an interview with the ARD television network in Bonn the chancellor asserted that there is no disagreement in the Bonn coalition government on this problem. However, when making a statement on Friday, Uwe Ronneburger, a member of the Free Democratic Party Presidium which forms part of the government, stressed that the Soviet-U.S. agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles should not fall through due to the fault of the FRG.

Destabilize NATO-WP Balance

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 33, 23-30 Aug 87 p 3

IN MID-SEPTEMBER Eduard Shevardnadze, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, will meet the US Secretary of State George Shultz in the United States.

If the meeting is successful, the two sides will sign an agreement, the first in the history of mankind, on the reduction of nuclear weapons; not only on reduction but on elimination, worldwide, of two classes of nuclear armaments of the USSR and the USA - medium-range (MRM) and operational-tactical missiles (OTM).

The implementation of this agreement will sharply reduce (though it won't eliminate finally) the danger of a direct Soviet-American thermonuclear conflict, and will appreciably diminish (though not to zero level) the threat of involving in such a conflict the European continent as well as the Asian and Pacific region. More terms will be created for reducing strategic nuclear armaments and for non-militarization of outer space. The prestige of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world will be enhanced infinitely.

The agreement has almost been worked out, and the road has been difficult. Only some details are still to be finalized, and also the question of the Pershing-1A, West German ballistic missiles with American nuclear warheads.

The obstacles do not seem to be too great. What danger can 72 missiles with a range of only 700 km pose to peace in Europe and to the global "zero" in two classes of nuclear weapons? Also, in the 15 years of their existence, they have become so decrepit that they might, as *Newsweek* put it, fall apart under their own weight. Is it worth making the future of a breakthrough to a nuclear-weapon-free world dependent on these old missiles, when more serious components of the security of the USSR and of the Warsaw Treaty Organization would have to be sacrificed for the sake of an almost ready agreement?

I would like to believe that this issue will be settled in the time left before the meeting of the heads of the Soviet and US diplomatic departments. I would like to hope that, in the last resort, a reasonable

compromise will be found during the meeting. And if not? Washington refuses to discuss these missiles. But it is not as simple as it seems to decide whether to sign the agreement on MRM and OTM, preserving Pershing-1A missiles.

With Pershing-1A missiles, we face practically the same situation as do Britain and France with their missiles and nuclear weapons: formally agreeing with the Soviet Union on a "global double zero" in MRM and OTM, the US actually involves in its thermonuclear strategy new states, and thereby establishes NATO's superiority over the Warsaw Treaty countries in this class of nuclear weapons by increasing, outside the negotiations, the potential of its allies. This, it may be recalled, will actually devalue not only the "global double zero" but also the "zero option" for Europe. The tactics are well-known: seek concessions from the USSR, but keep the Western potential intact.

From this viewpoint, attention is drawn to the recent scuffling about in NATO beyond the framework of the Soviet-American negotiations. Preparing for a likely agreement on MRM and OTM between the USSR and the USA, the North Atlantic alliance, with the direct participation of Washington, begins to take steps towards increasing disbalance in its favour as regards nuclear weapons in Europe, especially air- and sea-based.

Therefore, the actions of the West suggest that, in the context of delivering our planet from nuclear weapons, Pershing-1A missiles are not only a real obstacle along the road to an agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, but also one of the instruments for achieving strategic superiority by the USA and its allies over the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization as a whole. Thus, Pershing-1A missiles are not the issue. In this context the outcome of the forthcoming meeting between Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz remains to be seen, despite the almost finalized agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles.

'Round Table on Pershing 1-A's, Shultz 'Doctrine'

LD232144 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 23 Aug 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Dmitriy Antonovich Volskiy, member of the ZA RUBEZHOM editorial board, and Vadim Nikolayevich Nekrasov, international observer of KOMMUNIST, presented by Boris Andrianov, All-Union radio foreign political commentator]

[Excerpts] [Andrianov] Hello, comrades. We begin our meeting at the round-table. Taking part today are Dmitriy Antonovich Volskiy, member of the editorial board of the weekly ZA RUBEZHOM and Vadim Nikolayevich Nekrasov,

international observer of the journal KOMMUNIST. I see Dmitriy Antonovich wishes to speak first. Over to you, Dmitriy.

[Volskiy] What makes our era different from previous ages is the very fact that a genuine advantage can only be an advantage for all. In the nuclear space age, when we're all in the same boat, if you try to sink anyone you risk capsizing the whole boat. This is true both on the regional and on the global scale, and thus resolving conflicts can only be based on considering reality and respecting the interests of all who in one way or another are affected by a particular situation.

But then Washington believes differently. There, for example, the so-called Shultz doctrine is now looming large, as THE WASHINGTON POST reported on 19 August. What it amounts to, according to the newspaper, is that regional conflicts are linked to the Soviet-U.S. treaty on eliminating medium-range missiles that is in preparation. The way the doctrine is being expounded is pretty obscure, but as a simplification one can state that it is something like this: According to the Shultz doctrine the Soviet Union must cease to support its friends in the developing world and go along with the imposition of U.S. conditions in settling regional conflicts. Then, the story goes, the United States will take a more compliant line on medium-range missiles and other problems in curbing the arms race. But it's not for nothing the THE WASHINGTON POST describes this doctrine as very debatable from the diplomatic viewpoint. That's putting it mildly, since after all it's not just the Soviet Union, but the whole world including the United States, that has an interest in an agreement on missiles and in solving the other problems of disarmament.

[Nekrasov] I think one ought to remark that in the West this is the holiday season for politicians. The parliaments are in summer recess, and ~~and~~ in those official circles in the West attention to the problems of arms reduction and particularly eliminating medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles has recently waned. Correspondingly, the Western press has also been paying less attention to these topics. But there's one exception, and that is West Germany. On the banks of the Rhine a very lively political debate of these matters is continuing. This is despite the fact that the main protagonists of the debate have also deserted Bonn and gone to their summer residences. This is not stopping them from granting interviews from there, issuing statements and so forth. The issue, as you realize, is what is to become of the Pershing-1A missiles and the warheads for them, which I'm sure listeners already know about, since quite a lot has been written about this issue in our press.

At the time when the West German capital was discussing the issue of its attitude toward the possibility of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on what the West calls intermediate-range missiles, right-wing circles on the Rhine put forward the condition that the 72 Pershing-1A missiles directed against the Soviet Union be retained. In their time these missiles had been formally handed over to the Bonn ally by the U.S. authorities. Now, as a result of Bonn's official stance, the missiles are the main and, one might even say, the last obstacle in the way of formulating in treaty form a Soviet-U.S. agreement on eliminating a whole class of nuclear missiles.

[Andrianov] One might say, Vadim Nikolayevich, that a situation has come about in which the fate of a Soviet-U.S. accord finds itself, at least formally, in a position of dependence on the stance chosen by Bonn. If the West German capital does not wish to give up its aspirations there may not be an agreement. You will agree that the formulation of the issue by no means corresponds to the genuine character of relations between the members of the North Atlantic bloc.

[Nekrasov] No, of course it doesn't. You rightly observed that this dependence is formal. Well, this is indeed a characteristic feature of the relationships that have been established within the Western military alliance, that is, equality in words and in form, but in actuality relations of subordination.

In this connection, I would like to note the following point: In West Germany, as we are aware, there are in existence and actively operating reactionary revanchist circles that favor only tension in the continent. However, they are of course unable to count on independent success. It is another matter if they receive support from across the ocean, and indeed it should be said that recently they have received such support. Just consider this. First Alfred Dregger, a representative of the right wing of West German politicians, had a meeting with Frank Carlucci, the President's assistant, who assured him that Washington does not intend to apply any pressure on Bonn over this issue. Then Secretary of State Shultz in a message to West German Foreign Minister Genscher stressed that Washington does not intend to discuss with the Soviet Union the issue of the Pershing-1A missiles. Finally, Richard Burt, the U.S. ambassador in Bonn, warned outright in a public speech against West Germany giving up these missiles since, according to him, such a concession on Bonn's part will, he says, undermine the U.S. position at the Geneva negotiations.

[Andrianov] Consequently, it is a matter of consistent efforts directed with Bonn's help at putting pressure on the Soviet Union and forcing it to make further concessions, or maybe even at wrecking a Soviet-U.S. accord. How then do you assess these actions by Washington?

[Nekrasov] Well, certainly there is in this an element of the diplomatic game which accompanies all serious international negotiations.

They contain various countermoves, the creation of fall-back positions and so forth. But all these facts also indicate the complexity of the situation in the United States itself. Judging by a number of signs there is a continuing sharp, behind-the-scenes struggle there over the main issue of whether to conclude with the Soviet Union the first agreement in history on a real reduction of armaments and on eliminating a whole class of nuclear armaments. There is no doubt that people there are very well aware that the very fact of such an agreement would substantially alter the atmosphere in relations between the two superpowers, strengthen trust between them, and provide an impetus for further fruitful negotiations. This is why there is mounting resistance to a possible Soviet-U.S. accord on the part of the military-industrial complex and U.S. reactionary political circles.

Well, Dmitriy Antonovich spoke in this regard of the Shultz plan in particular. I myself should like to add a quotation from the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. This newspaper wrote a few days ago that within the White House, a still powerful group is set against any accord with Moscow and is prepared by all means to sabotage an imminent agreement on medium-range missiles.

[Andrianov] Well, if one considers the situation in the FRG on the basis of its own interests and the interrelationship there of political forces, what then are the prospects for resolving the Pershing-1A missile issue.

[Nekrasov] Well, you see, one needs to take account of a very important factor. Bonn's refusal to support what is called the double zero option solution would mean that the West German capital is assuming the very grave responsibility for wrecking an agreement which the world public is so expecting and which, as everyone is aware, would

be a most important positive factor for further world development. This is of course also realized by responsible right-wing politicians in the Federal Republic. The Christian Social Union, of course, under Strauss' leadership may now be accusing the Social Democratic Party of advocating elimination of the Pershings and thereby damaging the FRG's fundamental interests, they claim, and even allegedly of the whole Western alliance, as well as accusing the Social Democrats of allegedly fully siding with Moscow. However, here is what the West German HANNOVERSCHE ALLGEMEINE wrote in this regard. From the moment that the double zero proposal was put forward, the newspaper says, it was clear to all leading figures in the Bonn Cabinet that ultimately these missiles will have to be given up. The newspaper warns that the longer Bonn keeps silent, the more difficult this will be to do.

FRG Pershing-1A Stands Viewed

LD240912 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 23 Aug 87

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Stanislav Kondrashov]

[Text] [Kondrashov] At the beginning of the program I mentioned some international events which while notable were nevertheless events on the periphery. In the main area -- nuclear disarmament -- there has been a lull. There have been no new steps toward an agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe. Why? Let's listen to Bonn:

[Correspondent Vladimir Kondratyev, identified by screen caption] This summer the weather in the FRG has been a talking point for everybody. Sunny days have been rare; most days have been cloudy and rainy. But this isn't causing the politicians a great deal of worry. Most of them spend their holidays in warmer climes including the chancellor.

No matter how much they talk about the weather here, however, there are problems that are more important. The ruling coalition is currently experiencing a serious crisis. The Christian Democrats and their Bavarian comrades-in-arms have fallen out with each other. Strauss, the leader of the Christian Social Union [CSU], thunders unceasingly against the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] for its attempts to revise the traditional right wing conservative foundation. The Christian Democrats are also having difficulties with the other partner in the ruling coalition, the Free Democratic Party [FDP]. They cannot find a common language on questions of foreign policy and these differences, as CDU officials themselves estimate, are costing their party several percentage points of voters' support.

The key problem now is what is to happen to the Pershing-1A. It is a problem that has been created artificially. The Bundeswehr has missiles in its armory and not just the Pershings purchased from the United States in the 1960's. Officers and men maintain them and carry out exercises using them. If the FRG military men have such a strong desire to stage these games then that is their business. It is quite a different question when they try in Bonn to decide the fate of the main component which makes these missiles a terrible weapon -- the nuclear warheads. The warheads are kept under lock and key on U.S. bases and U.S. property.

It is only in the event of a nuclear clash that they must be installed in missiles under U.S. control and command. [video shows newspaper photographs of missiles and FRG troops handling missiles and assembling components of them in a small hanger-like building]

Bonn's position is illogical and therefore unreliable. No one can state openly that the warheads belong to the FRG because the FRG has rejected the possession of nuclear weapons. At the same time they talk about missiles -- including warheads -- belonging to a third country, in other words the FRG, which must, therefore, supposedly be taken out of the Soviet-U.S. agreement. When the relevant decision was adopted on 1 June it was calculated that the USSR would not want to make the fate of the agreement dependent upon these missiles. Such arguments are still being heard now. Those who on the day the decision was made warned that Bonn's problems were only just beginning were right. Now that the question has been raised in a very acute way. Now that the Pershing warheads really have become an obstacle on the path toward an accord, many of those who voted for a corrupt compromise are seriously worried. [video shows Kondratyev speaking to camera in the open air]

These are mostly Free Democrats. If the Geneva dialogue fails the whole world will see who is responsible. The FDP leaders, Foreign Minister Genscher and Bangemann, chairman of the party, are avoiding calling a spade a spade. Without mentioning the Pershing-IAs they state that the FRG must not hamper the United States and the USSR in their quest for unity. Ronneburger, deputy chairman of the parliamentary faction, is calling for the Pershings to be included in the talks in the interests of a double-zero solution.

In the opinion of the opposition Social Democrats, the Free Democrats are now closer to them than they are to their coalition partners. The moment of truth will come in the Bundestag after the holidays. Then the Social Democrats and the Greens will put the question to the vote directly. [video shows clips of appearances of FRG politicians on television; conference scenes]

Chancellor Kohl is avoiding making hasty statements on this topic. There are grounds for believing, however, that in his department they are looking hard for a way out of the difficult situation into which the Bonn government has incautiously got itself. The Chancellor has been obliged to take into account pressure from the extreme right wingers within his ranks. The Bavarian, Strauss, who is always seeking grounds for criticism -- well, there he is, he will not fail to rebuff any encroachment upon nuclear additions to the Pershings which he secured for the FRG during his time as defense minister.

Indeed Strauss is suspected first and foremost of creating the prerequisites for turning the FRG into a nuclear power. [video shows Chancellor Kohl being interviewed by an unidentified correspondent; and Strauss also being interviewed]

On the FRG territory that he governs near the village of Wackersdorf, a powerful center for processing used elements from nuclear power stations is being built. This is a model of the facility which is being built. The enrichment process makes it possible to obtain the plutonium which is essential for developing nuclear charges. FRG television journalists have carried out a serious analysis of the extent to which the Wackersdorf center serves this objective.

Riesenhuber, minister of science and technology, has no doubts. The nuclear fuel which will be produced at Wackersdorf is unsuitable for developing a bomb. Scientists, and even those who carry out investigations on behalf of the Defense Ministry say however, that from the scientific point of view, it is quite possible. All one has to do is to incorporate a few technical refinements.

Those who are opposed to the project point out continually that a national center for the production of warheads would be intolerable. They cannot be deluded by talk about the nuclear elements from the reactors being unsuitable. They are well informed about the fact that just one simple step would be enough to enrich the spent elements after, say 3 months rather than the 3 years that has been prescribed; then all the technical problems will disappear. The plutonium will be the best. [video shows model of the Wackersdorf plant; newspaper pictures and cuttings; demonstrations taking place at the site; press drawings illustrating the processes]

If the direct route from the reactor to the atomic bomb runs via plutonium, then Wackersdorf represents an indirect road for transforming the FRG into a nuclear power, DER SPIEGEL magazine believes. To those who look ahead it is clear that nuclear warheads require means of delivery and that is why they do not want to give up the Pershings, which, according to the plans of the steel helmet faction -- that is what they call the dyed-in-the-wool opponents of disarmament -- are due to be replaced with new and more modern missiles by the year 1991. Whether they want it or not on the banks of the Rhine, there is still going to have to be a return to serious talking about the Pershing-1As. These discussions are not over. The double zero has to live up to its name and it is clear to anyone who can count that zero plus zero makes zero and not 72. The sooner this truth is recognized in Bonn the quicker it will be possible to move toward an accord which for the first time will open up the possibility of considerably reducing the nuclear death potential that has been amassed in Europe. [video shows Kondratyev speaking to camera in the open air]

[Kondrashov] A few words about the U.S. position. They still stand by their 72 warheads for the Pershing-1As just like one might say, Pilate washing his hands. They still say that they will not bring into the bilateral U.S.-Soviet talks in Geneva their relations and their agreement with a third party -- that is to say with the FRG. This position was repeated last week by Secretary of State Shultz and also by Burt, the U.S. Ambassador in Bonn. One can only guess how the matter will be cleared up by the date of the meeting between Comrade Shevardnadze and Shultz in the United States in the middle of September.

U.S. Position Criticized

LD241653 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 24 Aug 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video talk by Political Observer Boris Kalyagin]

[Text] The world press is paying more attention to the meeting between USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State Shultz, scheduled for mid-September. During these talks a final accord might be reached concerning a draft agreement on the global elimination of all Soviet and U.S. medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. In its turn, this would help resolve the question of a new summit meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

Time, however, does not stand still and the closer the awaited dialogue becomes, the more doubts surface as to whether it will take place at all. It is the U.S. side's position that has become the reason for this. It is a fossilized and openly destructive position. The United States continues to refuse to discuss the question of eliminating its nuclear warheads for the 72 Pershing-1A missiles belonging to the West German Bundeswehr.

Could it really be the case, certain Western observers ask with emotion, that talks on eliminating 2,000 nuclear warheads can be deadlocked because of some 72 obsolete missiles? This question should be asked of the U.S. Administration and its Bonn partner and, moreover, ought to be asked more precisely. After all, the delay is not caused by the West German Pershing-1A missiles with which the FRG is free to do what it wants; the matter revolves around the U.S. nuclear warheads for them. It is these warheads that ought to be subject to destruction if a double zero option agreement is signed.

As for the United States, it is trying by hook or crook to set these outside the framework of an accord. THE WASHINGTON TIMES daily, referring to a conversation with a high-ranking U.S. Administration representative, even goes so far as to assert that President Reagan would sooner leave his post without having signed an agreement with our country than give up the warheads for the FRG's missiles.

The question then arises: Is Washington officialdom interested in attaining a mutually acceptable agreement? However, the matter is not confined merely to the warheads for the Pershings. The United States is unwilling to fully eliminate its cruise missiles deployed in Western Europe. It merely proposes that nuclear warheads on them be replaced with non nuclear ones. This, however, would leave a loophole open to preserving nuclear capability -- after all, it would, in practice, be very difficult to verify [kontrol] which warheads are mounted on the missiles, with or without nuclear charges.

The Americans also insist that we should be the first to begin reductions of our missiles; that we should make the number of our warheads on medium-range missiles correspond to the number of the U.S. total deployed in Western Europe, and that only then would the United States join us in this. That is to say, according to Washington's designs, we would for 2-3 years unilaterally reduce our arms, while the United States would monitor us [kontrol], likewise unilaterally. This option is, of course, unacceptable. We offer reductions on the basis of equal percentages. Let us say that during the first 3 years each side would reduce the number of its missiles by 50 percent.

If this fails to suit the Americans, we offer yet another solution: Let all nuclear warheads at first be removed from medium-range missiles within 1 year. Thus, even though these weapons would be preserved in their positions, they would not be in a state of combat readiness.

We are ready to steer a course for sensible compromises and concessions, but we draw the line somewhere, and it is defined by equal security of both sides. We have already gone our half of the way and maybe even a bit further. The answer is now up to the United States.

Pershing-1A's May Impede Summit

LD251214 Moscow TASS in English 1125 GMT 25 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 25 TASS -- Keen debates are under way in the Federal Republic of Germany over the questions of what role the Pershing-1A missile problem can play as regards holding a meeting between the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state in Washington and whether this problem will be of consequence to holding a Soviet-American summit meeting.

A TASS diplomatic correspondent put the same questions today to Viktor Karpov, chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Arms Limitation and Disarmament Department. The latter offered this reply:

The Soviet Union is for a Soviet-American summit meeting. We take the view that periodic contacts between the leaders of the two great powers are forums that make it possible to analyze the state of relations between the USSR and the United States in depth and comprehensively and to look for ways of improving them and for solutions to major security problems on a global scale.

The Geneva and Reykjavik meetings between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan have borne this out. The Reykjavik meeting has demonstrated, in particular, that there is a possibility to open the door to the nuclear-free world and search for ways of cutting the nuclear arms of the USSR and the United States substantially.

The most advanced issue at Soviet-American talks in Geneva at present is that of drafting a treaty for eliminating Soviet and American medium-range and shorter-range missiles and nuclear warheads for them on a global scale.

However, there are impediments in the way of work to hammer out this agreement. There are difficulties in discussing also other important matters -- an accord for strengthening the regime of the ABM Treaty and an accord for halving the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States.

So can one talk about preparing a summit meeting without taking into account the state of talks between the USSR and the United States on the central problems of global security? Hardly, especially as the next meeting should be prepared so as to be productive.

Much significance in preparing the summit meeting belongs to the meeting between the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state. It needs to be thoroughly prepared as well.

The resolution of the problems on the agenda of that meeting should be prepared in advance. For this, it is essential to solve the problem of American warheads for West German Pershing-1A missiles.

This is why those attempting to play down the impact which the Pershing-1A's can have on the preparation of a Soviet-American accord for eliminating the Soviet and American medium-range and shorter-range missiles should be aware of the following: The point effectively is that the American warheads for the West German Pershing-1A missiles may prove the obstacle that will make it impossible to organize a fruitful meeting between the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state in Washington and, consequently, a Soviet-American summit meeting.

Gerasimov News Conference

LD251612 Moscow TASS in English 1401 GMT 25 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 25 TASS -- "The Soviet Union makes every effort for the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear and space arms to make vigorous headway, in particular, in the main direction for today: in reaching agreement on global elimination of medium- and short-range missiles," Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at a briefing at the ministry's press centre today.

"Unfortunately, the U.S. side for the present moment evades a constructive working out of key issues. First of all, the 72 American nuclear warheads for the West German short-range missiles remain an obstacle. Still, one would like to hope that our U.S. partners for the talks will become aware of the cruciality of the moment and of the fact that resultativeness of a meeting between the minister of foreign affairs of the USSR and the U.S. secretary of state depends on them".

"Inventions have been circulated in the Western press that the Soviet stand on the nuclear warheads for the West German Pershing-1A missiles is ostensibly undergoing changes. References are made, in particular, to the interview given by Soviet scientist Lev Semeyko to the West German newspaper FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, in which it was maintained that the Geneva talks would not be frustrated because of that".

"It is appropriate to point out that the Soviet Government's stand is expressed by its official spokesmen. Therefore it would be wrong to seek a reflection of the stand in pronouncements by private persons such as the above-mentioned Soviet scientist".

"The Soviet stand remains the same: We are for the realisation of 'double global zero option', but this requires complete elimination of all medium- and short-range missiles everywhere together with their warheads without any exceptions".

"There is talk in the U.S. press as well as in foreign diplomatic circles in Moscow that the United States has ostensibly suggested the following version to the Soviet side to resolve the Pershing-1A missile issue: Owing to the fact that the missiles have become obsolete already now, one may agree that they may remain and that in five years' time they will cease to exist. The five years will, obviously, be precisely the period for the elimination of short-range missiles. So, a 'global zero option' will work out."

"But even if one admits that the missiles will become obsolete," Gennadiy Gerasimov said, "the American warheads for them will not become obsolete, and will remain available. So, there will be no 'global zero option'."

"There is also talk that the Soviet Union holds a firm stand on the Pershing-1A issue because it allegedly expects to drive a wedge between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)".

"The Soviet Union does not at all intend to drive such a wedge," the USSR Foreign Ministry's spokesman said.

"We are realists and we take into account the cooperation which has developed between the United States and the FRG in many fields, including the military one. We would like through joint efforts to look for ways to remove military confrontation in Europe".

Emergency Bundestag Session Called

LD252332 Moscow TASS in English 1507 GMT 25 Aug 87

[Text] Bonn August 25 TASS -- A group of the Greens Party in Bundestag has welcomed the decision of a parliamentary group of the Social Democratic Party of Germany to demand the convocation next week of an emergency session of Bundestag for discussing the stand of the West German Government on the problem of 72 Pershing-1A missiles. This is reported in a statement of the group of the Greens Party which came up with similar demands before. The statement was circulated here today. It expressed hope that at the session which it was suggested to convene a decision will be taken by the majority of votes on West Germany's rejection of Pershing-1A missiles, if Free Democrats, partners of CDU-CSU by the ruling coalition, support it.

Motivating the demand of Social Democrats on holding the emergency session of West German parliament, Hans-Jochen Vogel, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, pointed out in a TV interview that the session should clear up Bonn's stand on the Pershing-1A problem, because its demand that the FRG keep those missiles for itself blocked the reaching of a Soviet-American agreement. It is in the interests of West Germany that the dynamics of arms buildup be replaced by the disarmament dynamics. The stand of Free Democrats on this problem is inconsistent, unlike that of the opposition parties -- the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Greens Party. Thus, Wolfgang Mischnik, chairman of a parliamentary group of the Free Democratic Party, said in today's interview with the Deutschlandfunk broadcasting station that his party supported the "double zero option" which, as he put it, should not fail through the fault of West Germany. At the same time, he spoke against the holding of the emergency session of Bundestag on the grounds that it would allegedly make U.S. stand at the Geneva talks more complicated. Uve Ronneburger, deputy chairman of the parliamentary group of the Free Democratic Party, stated that the parties of the ruling coalition should work out a common stand on the Pershing-1A problem. He opposed the modernization of those missiles.

FRG's Genscher Cited

LD251925 Moscow TASS in English 1844 GMT 25 Aug 87

[Text] Bonn August 25 TASS -- West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher today stated that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany would do everything depending on it to have the "double zero option" for intermediate-range missiles be implemented. This statement was issued in a bulletin of the West German Foreign Ministry. The "double zero option" is not any unilateral concession by the West to the East, but makes a contribution to the cause of ensuring security and stability of East-West relations. It accords with the interests of the peoples of the two German states. We wish success to the talks. They will not collapse through our fault, we will do everything necessary for their successful conclusion. The West German government admits that by its approach to the significance of both "zero options" the Soviet Union met the West halfway.

However, in his statement Genscher did not touch the issue of "Pershing-1A" missiles in service with the Bundeswehr, which is the key impediment to the conclusion of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Appearing on television Friday, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated one more time that Bonn would not give up the "Pershing-1A" missiles.

Reagan's Speech

LD262030 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1955 GMT 26 Aug 87

[Text] Washington, 26 Aug (TASS) — TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev reports:

President Reagan's speech in Los Angeles today was earlier described by the White House as "a major and important address on questions of East-West relations and, primarily, relations between the United States and the USSR."

The head of the White House said the opportunities that exist for improving the international climate are "too great" to pass up. But to achieve this, as is apparent from further pronouncements by the President, the Soviet Union "must" fulfill a whole number of demands submitted by the United States on radical changes in its domestic and foreign policy. Only then, apparently, would the USSR "prove its sincerity". But what should the United States be doing? Judging from the President's speech, precisely nothing: It would merely demand and continue its present course without any changes at all.

The President reaffirmed the United States' adherence to the doctrine of neoglobalism, which envisages interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Here he accused the Soviet Union of somehow "showing too little real desire" for a settlement of regional conflicts. The same approach was reflected in pronouncements by the President on questions of disarmament. Reagan again made it abundantly clear that the United States wants to leave the question of the U.S. nuclear warheads intended for the "Pershing-1A" missiles, which are at the disposal of the Bundeswehr, out of the Geneva talks.

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CSO: 5200/1643

SOVIET REPORTING ON KOHL'S PERSHING 1-A STATEMENT

Conditional Elimination

LD261742 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1632 GMT 26 Aug 87

[Text] Bonn, 26 Aug (TASS) — FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl devoted a substantial part of the press conference held here today on establishing his government's position on the 72 Pershing-1A missiles fitted with U.S. nuclear warheads. These nuclear missile systems have become the main obstacle toward the conclusion of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on medium-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles.

In the wake of Washington, the chancellor asserted yet again that the Pershing-1A missiles with nuclear warheads "have not been and cannot be the subject of Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva". At the same time he declared that the USSR's demand for the elimination of these missiles with nuclear warheads is supposedly "unjustified," and is allegedly "an artificial obstacle on the path to the conclusion of a treaty on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles". Political observers see this statement as an attempt to shift the blame for a possible failure of the Geneva talks onto the Soviet Union.

[Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1825 GMT on 26 August transmitted a service message adding the following: "Meanwhile, the USSR has never demanded that the 'Pershing-1A's' be included in the Geneva talks. It is a matter of the nuclear warheads which are intended for these missiles but which belong to the United States and, consequently, should be included in an accord."]

The Chancellor, however, did not fully rule out the possibility that the FRG would give up the modernization of the Pershing-1A's or eliminate them. At the same time he linked this possible step with a whole series of preconditions and reservations.

"If," he said, "an accord is reached between the United States and the Soviet Union at Geneva on the elimination of all medium-range missiles on a global scale;

If as yet unsettled questions of monitoring are resolved in a way that suits all interested parties;

If this agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces is ratified by the parties to the agreement and comes into force;

And if, finally, the parties to the agreement observed the agreed deadline for the elimination of their weapons systems;

Then, if this happens, I am ready to declare even today that with the definitive elimination of all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles, the Pershing-1A missiles will not be modernized, but eliminated."

[Moscow TASS International Service here also added the following: "FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, (Free Democratic Party) [FDP], today expressed satisfaction with Kohl's statement regarding the 'Pershing-1A's'. The chancellor's pronouncements were on the whole also welcomed by the FDP's parliamentary faction. "Horst Emke, deputy chairman of the parliamentary faction of the Social Democratic Party [SDP] of Germany, assessed Kohl's statement as 'definite progress'. At the same time he drew attention to the fact that the statement contains 'a number of preconditions, the scale of which it is too early to predict'. Emke reaffirmed the Social Democrats' demand to hold an extraordinary session of the Bundestag on 2 September in order to discuss the question of the 'Pershing-1A's'. "Criticizing Bonn's position as set out by Kohl, the SDP's press bulletin, *Parlamentarisch-Politischer Pressedienst*, points to a statement by SDP Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel, who at today's press conference in Bonn stressed that from his party's viewpoint the best solution would be the immediate and unconditional liquidation of these missiles."]

PRAVDA Reports Statement

PM270744 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Aug 87
Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Yakhontov report: "Four 'Ifs': Chancellor H. Kohl's Press Conference"]

[Text] Bonn, 26 Aug — FRG Federal Chancellor H. Kohl spoke at a press conference today. One of the main questions which the FRG head of government addressed was that of the attitude to the Soviet-U.S. talks now in progress in Geneva.

The chancellor reaffirmed the readiness to "do everything in the Federal government's power to promote success in Geneva," which, he said, is now "within reach."

However, on the subject of the 72 Pershing-1A missile systems belonging to the FRG with nuclear warheads under U.S. control, H. Kohl presented the matter in a distorted light. He stated that the Soviet Union is demanding the inclusion of the question of the Pershing-1A's in the Geneva talks, which "is unjustified and constitutes an attempt to create an artificial obstacle" to the conclusion of an agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. Yet it is well known that our country has demanded nothing of the kind, it was and is only a question of the American nuclear warheads.

Noting that he wants to help the U.S. President to conclude the Geneva talks successfully, H. Kohl went on to state that on certain conditions, the Pershing-1A missiles will not be modernized, but will be destroyed. What are these conditions? If the USSR and the United States reach an accord in Geneva on the total elimination of all medium-range missiles; if "first of all" the still open questions of monitoring and verification for all interested parties are resolved; if an agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles is ratified by the contracting parties and comes into force; and if, finally, the contracting parties comply with an agreed schedule for the destruction of their missile systems.

Is not this rather a large number of stipulations, in which all kinds of things could be submerged? Does it not appear that Bonn is all but laying claim to the role of arbiter on the question of the implementation of a possible agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles? Does Bonn's "surprise" really remove the obstacle, known to everyone, to the attainment of this agreement?

Statement Deserves Attention

LD261952 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Aug 87

[Viktor Levin commentary]

[Text] I have in front of me a cable from Bonn. It was sent by DPA and sets out the full text of Federal Chancellor Kohl's statement at today's news conference. We have already reported that Kohl made an equivocal statement in which, on the one hand, he did all he could to try to persuade his listeners that the Pershing-1A missiles, or to be more precise, the missile systems — because what is involved is not just missiles, and not so much missiles, as the U.S. warheads on these missiles — are not a subject for Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva.

He went on to make a statement that, it seems to me, deserves attention. At any rate, it requires careful study. Admittedly, before making the statement, he set out four ifs. If the United States and the Soviet Union reach unanimity at Geneva on the worldwide removal of medium-range missiles; if as yet unresolved questions of monitoring [proverka] are resolved; if a treaty on the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles is enacted; and if, finally, the partners in the negotiations agree on a timescale for effecting the elimination of the missile systems — and, strictly speaking, this last if clearly seems to relate to the previous one, but this if is there nevertheless — then if that happens, and I am quoting Kohl verbatim: I am ready to affirm today that with the definitive removal of all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles, the Pershing-1A missiles will not be modernized but destroyed. It must be said frankly that this is a step forward by the FRG Government, but, I repeat, a careful analysis is still needed to assess how far this step goes.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

LUXEMBOURG'S FISCHBACH ON ARMS TALKS, CONVENTIONAL ARMS

Luxembourg LUXEMBURGER WORT in German 4 Jun 87 p 4

[Interview by the LUXEMBURGER WORT with Marc Fischbach, minister of defense, on disarmament negotiations and the strengthening of conventional arms]

[Text] The disarmament discussions should result in greater security for the peoples of Western Europe, emphasized army minister Marc Fischbach in an interview with the [Question]. In this context, he summarized the results of the consultations held by the NATO defense ministers. The minister emphasized that disarmament should not be limited to intermediate-range missiles. Deterrence continues to have two components, the nuclear as well as the conventional aspect, both of which are inseparably linked to each other. For this reason, disarmament negotiations should be accompanied by discussions aimed at the complete elimination of chemical weapons and of the disequilibrium that exists in Europe in the area of conventional weapons in favor of the Warsaw pact, as well as at a 50-percent reduction in strategic weapons systems.

Minister Marc Fischbach also pointed out that the NATO partners must allocate increased funding for conventional weapons. He also discussed the Luxembourg contribution to NATO in this context.

Globalization of Disarmament Negotiations?

[Question] Last week the NATO defense ministers concluded their traditional spring meeting. They expressed a desire to eliminate the serious shortcomings that exist in the area of conventional defense. During the meeting, they also expressed approval of the fact that prospects have improved for an agreement on the reduction of American and Soviet nuclear weapons. How do the Europeans view this development, also in view of the coming meeting of the foreign ministers in Reykjavik?

[Answer] In all modesty, it can be said that during the last meeting, held in Luxembourg, of the West Europe Union (WEU), the disarmament advisers among the Europeans entered into a decisive phase. On this occasion the 7 WEU partners announced their intention to set as a goal that intermediate-range nuclear missiles be reduced in Europe, in accordance with a proposal made in 1981, i.e. a zero-solution. This effects intermediate-range missiles with a longer

range (1,000 - 5,500 km; SS-20 and Pershing II). Moreover, a general objective was expressed that in the area of intermediate-range missiles with a shorter range (500 - 1,000 km) an attempt should also be made to keep levels as low as possible, or a zero solution.

This European posture was confirmed in Stavanger by the Americans and the other alliance partners during a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). However, the general wish was expressed both by the Germans as well as by the Americans that disarmament negotiations should be globalized, i.e. that a zero solution should not be limited to Europe alone. In this regard, it was pointed out that disarmament in the nuclear realm should not be restricted to intermediate-range missiles. Deterrence continues to have two components, the nuclear as well as the conventional aspect, which are inseparably linked to each other.

In this sense, at the urging of the allies, the disarmament discussions must be accompanied by negotiations which aim at both the complete elimination of chemical weapons and of the disequilibrium that exists in Europe in favor of the Warsaw Pact, as well as the 50 percent progressive reduction in strategic weapons systems.

Strict Verification Possibilities Necessary

[Question] How do you view the disequilibrium in conventional weapons; in the view of the NATO defense ministers, should these arms be considerably strengthened?

[Answer] In the area of conventional weapons, attention should focus on eliminating the present disequilibrium that favors the Warsaw Pact. Here there is a challenge for the Europeans to work out a joint position in the negotiations with the Warsaw Pact nations as was passed by the Council of Ministers of the alliance in 1986 Halifax, and resolved in Brussels in December 1986. Only this global concept will make it possible to preserve the existence of deterrence and thereby to affirm the NATO doctrine of flexible response.

Despite all efforts to bring the military equilibrium to the lowest possible levels, it should never be forgotten that disarmament is not an end in itself, but can be justified only according to the degree to which it enhances the security of the peoples of Western Europe. This can only happen when realistic and strict possibilities for verification exist.

Good Prospects for Successful Outcome of the Disarmament Discussions

[Question] How do you view the outcome of the disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union?

[Answer] The prospects are extremely favorable. These discussions can be expected to lead to positive results. It should also be assumed that the Germans will be able to contribute a corresponding solution without endangering their own security interests. The question remains open whether the Soviet short-range missiles that are aimed at the FRG do not make at least

a counterforce necessary, which would no longer be the case if all systems above the 500 km range were totally eliminated. Along these lines, U.S. President Ronald Reagan has expressed his support for excluding the Pershing IA from the negotiations. This week the Germans gave their approval of this proposal.

Additional Credits for Conventional Arms

[Question] Will not a modernization of conventional weapons systems have top priority as a result of disarmament in the nuclear sphere?

[Answer] Naturally, in the wake of nuclear disarmament the modernization and upgrading of conventional weapons systems will take on even greater importance. The NATO partners must obligate themselves to make additional credits available for conventional weapons. The goal of an annual increase in defense spending of 3 percent in real terms must be achieved.

Increasing the Supplies of Munitions and Fuel

[Question] Where are the priorities in this area?

[Answer] The NATO defense ministers established at their spring meeting that the priorities in the conventional area include a modernization of artillery weapons, an increase in munitions and fuel reserves, air defense, modernization of strategic lines of communication, security of air ports and supply lines.

Development of Classical Anti-Ballistic Defense Systems

[Question] What is the rationale for an increase in the effectiveness of conventional weapons?

[Answer] The development of classical anti-ballistic defense systems is of top priority. It is also necessary to utilize the range of new technological advances which make it possible to realize the FOFA concept (NATO's ability to carry out a strike against the second wave of attack).

Luxembourg Intends to Meet its Commitment to Host Nation Support.

[Question] What does the decision of the defense ministers mean regarding the strengthening of conventional arms for our own country, which, after all, is reaching the goal of an annual increase in military spending of three percent in real terms?

[Answer] Among other things, Luxembourg must increase its contingent. The first priority is to meet the commitment which we assumed within the framework of the agreement on host nation support; i.e., among other things, by strengthening the logistic support for those American armed forces which would move across our country in the event of a crisis. This was the reason for our government's decision to restructure our AMF contribution and to organize it in a more flexible manner. This means that additional forces would be made available to secure the national territory. There is also the possibility of

freeing up 150 volunteers, by placing the soldiers who attend the army school beyond the contingent.

Defense System against Low-Altitude Aircraft?

[Question] You mentioned earlier that security is to be increased at NATO airports. Luxembourg is also a NATO airport. How do you envision the defense of our Findel, since the Luxembourg army does not have the necessary defense material?

[Answer] That is correct. At present, the Luxembourg army does not have a weapons system for the defense of our Findel against air attacks. In the coming years, it will probably be inevitable that the security of Findel will be given top priority, among other things, perhaps with a study on the eventual procurement of air defense systems. A defense system against low-altitude aircraft could be established within the framework of the agreement on host nation support.

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CSO: 5200/2557

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

ITALIAN LEADERS WELCOME U.S.-USSR AGREEMENT

LD191924 Rome International Service in Italian 1555 GMT 19 Sep 87

[Text] The (approval) of the Italians for the historic agreement between the United States and the Soviets on the elimination of Euromissiles is reflected in the big newspaper headlines and in the statements by political leaders and government representatives.

Foreign Minister Andreotti recalled that Italy was the first nation which following last year's Reykjavik summit gave its immediate ("consent") to the initiative. If I am especially satisfied, Andreotti went on to say, it is because a line of dialogue has been affirmed for which we have always worked and which I consider to be essential in order to resolve other problems.

In the judgement of the socialist party secretary, Craxi, the announcement of the agreement reinforces the hope that a new cycle of detente is starting in which a great number of problems, still outstanding peaceful solutions, and agreements can be opened.

The communist leader Natta speaks of a historic novelty of a first understanding between the United States and the USSR, from which one could proceed to a reduction in nuclear stockpiles and not only to a limitation of their growth.

For the president of the Senate, Spadolini, the agreement on the reduction of nuclear arms represents a victory for the policy of the U.S. Administration and the new Soviet course. Spadolini has also stressed the contribution which the European countries are making to nuclear detente; however, they should now serry their ranks from the military point of view as the nuclear umbrella over the continent has fallen away.

In conclusion, for Social Democratic Defense Under Secretary Scovacricchi, the U.S.-USSR understanding has opened a new negotiations era which has been arrived at by the firmness demonstrated by the Atlantic Alliance.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

ITALY'S ANDREOTTI ON U.S.-USSR ACCORD

Andreotti on Accord

AU211139 Rome ANSA in English 1028 GMT 21 Sep 87

[Excerpt] (ANSA) Rome, September 21--The view that the general agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the elimination of intermediate range nuclear missiles around the world "is only the first of a long series of accords" was taken by Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti who also discussed developments in the Gulf in an interview published Sunday.

Delving into the reasons which brought the superpowers together for an understanding on medium and shorter range missiles, Andreotti pointed to realism. "Aside from moral impulses and a sense of responsibility, the closeness of the U.S. and the Soviet Union must also be attributed to Washington's conditions of financial imbalance and (Soviet leader Mikhail) Gorbachev's need to take a significant slice out of military spending to earmark it for civilian and social development programmes. This is a policy which favours a further disarmament race".

The diplomatic chief said, in this connection, that the "next steps should be: 1) Agreement to halve intercontinental ballistic missiles; 2) A sharp shift to a new and lower balance in conventional arms; 3) a ban on chemical and biological weapons".

On NATO strategy for post-intermediate nuclear force agreement between the superpowers, Andreotti affirmed that "the Europe-American defense ties must remain in place for a long time".

Speaking for publication in the Sunday edition of a big Rome daily, *Il Messaggero*, Andreotti said that as far as regional crises are concerned "also the other questions pending in the international area should benefit from the climate of detente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Further Comments

LD212044 Rome International Service in Italian 1730 GMT 21 Sep 87

[Excerpts] Foreign Minister Andreotti spoke about the crisis in the Persian Gulf at the Friendship Festival which has opened in Palermo. Here is a report by Caterina Antonangeli. [passage omitted]

The main actor in the first debate at the festival was Giulio Andreotti who answered our questions.

[Begin recording] [Antonangeli] Do you consider that Europe has received the agreement on the dismantling of the Euromissiles with a certain coolness?

[Andreotti] Europe has not received this decision with surprise, and therefore, with coolness. Europe worked on this decision because a few hours after Reykjavik, the meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan, there was a NATO meeting. We all went there, and we gave—I would like to say so with a certain pride, Italy being the first—our full support to the United States to attain this objective. So, there is no coolness.

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CSO: 5200/2402

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

ITALY'S GORIA MEETS USSR AMBASSADOR LUNKOV

AU250925 Rome ANSA in English 0813 GMT 25 Sep 87

[Text] (ANSA) Rome—Italian Premier Giovanni Goria suggested further cuts in nuclear and conventional weapons stocks when he discussed the recent superpower nuclear arms limitation agreement with the Soviet ambassador to Rome Nikolay Lunkov, Wednesday evening, an official communique released Thursday said.

The September 18 agreement to dismantle shorter and intermediate nuclear forces was hailed by Lunkov as an "historic" accord which, "for the first time allows for the withdrawal and destruction of nuclear systems" the communique said.

Lunkov went on to say that Moscow hoped that this accord might provide a basis for further developments in negotiations leading to substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenal of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Goria, the note continued, reminded Lunkov that Italy had been the first country to lend its official support to the double-zero option, and joined with Lunkov in hoping that the accord would lead to even greater things.

Following the agreement to remove these nuclear weapons Goria said, an effort should be made to come up with a concept of European security including redistribution of conventional weapons at levels which involve less cost and less risk, the communique reported.

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CSO: 5200/2402

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SPAIN WELCOMES SUPERPOWERS' 'STEP FORWARD'

Government Communique

LD181348 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1300 GMT 18 Sep 87

[Excerpt] We now go to the Moncloa Palace [prime minister's residence] for the statement issued by the Spanish Government on the agreement in principle between the two superpowers for the dismantling of the medium- and short-range missiles. Go ahead Luise Carlos Ramirez:

[Ramirez] The best thing would be for you to hear the government spokesman himself, who read out the following communique just a few minutes ago:

[Begin spokesman recording] As you know, the government has been in favor of this so-called double zero option from the outset and, therefore, welcomes with great satisfaction the step forward which is taking place at this time. The government also wishes to stress that by virtue of this agreement, for the first time in history the complete elimination will begin of a class of nuclear weapons, and unprecedented mechanisms of reciprocal control will be established. The government believes these results would not have been possible without the cohesion and solidarity of the allies and will without doubt contribute to creating the necessary confidence, to promoting detente, and to making possible further disarmament agreements. [end recording]

[Ramirez] This was the government's appraisal of the U.S.-USSR agreement. [passage omitted]

Gonzalez Lauds Accord

LD190123 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 2100 GMT 18 Sep 87

[Excerpts] We can now expand on what is undoubtedly the most important news of the day which will go down in history as the first agreement reached between the superpowers on dismantling the first nuclear arms. [passage omitted]

Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez gave a positive assessment of the preliminary agreement that has been reached. He was speaking to a television correspondent:

[Begin Gonzalez recording] To live through a historic event such as an agreement—I repeat, a preliminary one—which could be turned into a treaty that for the first time would eliminate some nuclear arms—it seems this is an event of enormous importance that of course supersedes all other considerations that must be made, that must be added, for one to be serious, accurate, or prudent. Call it what you like, but it is a historic event. Humanity can breathe easier with the knowledge that we are going in the right direction. [end recording] [passage omitted]

In his first reaction, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez described the preliminary agreement on disarmament as an important step, as we just heard, although he added that it must be consolidated and brought to the point where a treaty is signed. Here is a summary of his comments to Spanish television correspondent Adolfo Lefort:

[Lefort] According to Felipe Gonzalez, this event shows that the theory of peace by increment is the only valid one and that a unilateral view of disarmament is an illusion. Peace, he said, is only guaranteed when there is a balance that prevents anyone from initiating an attack. The Spanish prime minister believes it will be fairly easy to achieve a reduction of strategic weapons and a balance—a balancing down—of conventional ones.

[Begin recording] An agreement can be reached and should be reached on strategic—so-called strategic—long-range weapons. This is a bit of a joke for Europe, because for us the medium-range ones are as strategic as the other ones; they are the ones that kill European citizens, they are liable to destroy European citizens. It is extremely important the philosophy of a balance in conventional weapons should begin now—a balancing down—if there is not to be an outbreak of the conventional arms race. It would be absurd. [end recording]

[Lefort] Felipe Gonzalez stresses the importance of creating disarmament control and verification mechanisms, which are essential, although almost no one will like them because it is difficult to willingly agree to open the doors of a country's defensive systems to another country. In any case, and with all the difficulties, the achievement of the double zero option for the elimination of short- and medium-range missiles is described by the prime minister as a giant step for humanity. It is a step that does not exhaust the concept of peace because this is a problem of confidence and of mutual relations guaranteed by the coming together and homogeneity of political systems, which will have to renounce the battle for hegemony. Gonzalez rules out any connection between the agreement that has been reached and the Hispano-U.S. negotiations on troop reductions, which can be described as having disagreements, but not as hostile. They are, he says, the consequence of the decision made by the Spanish people in a referendum.

[Begin recording] Logically [word indistinct] a new controversy which does not have much to do with this, whether this has any connection with our agreement with the United States. I do not think so. If anyone wants to link the new dimension in conventional policy—and there is undoubtedly a new dimension ("in") the problem of conventional weapons—with the bilateral agreement, they will probably be greatly surprised to find there are also going to be negotiations on the reduction of conventional ones. This, in principle, would reinforce our point of view. But in any case, it is something earlier. Look, the problem is very easy: The Spanish people made a decision. Those of us who have political responsibility can do only one thing: put it into practice in the best possible way, of course being completely faithful. [Words indistinct] discussions are discussions that might make sense to some extent, or might not. But they are pointless. [end recording] [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/2403

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

GREECE'S PAPANDREOU ON U.S.-SOVIET MISSILE AGREEMENT

Congratulates Reagan, Gorbachev

NC182141 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 2100 GMT 18 Sep 87

[Statement by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou on 18 September "welcoming" the U.S.-Soviet agreement in principle to abolish short- and medium-range missiles; place not given--read by announcer]

[Text] I believe this day will remain an important one in history. It is a truly important fact that the two leaders, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, have agreed not only to meet, but also to continue with efforts to resolve the question of medium- and short-range missiles in the European region. This is a tremendous success for mankind. We must congratulate both leaders for their achievement.

I would like to add that, in addition to short- and medium-range missiles, there is agreement in principle—at least it appears to be the case at its birth—for an end to [nuclear] tests. There is also an intention to reduce the arsenal of strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent.

For us as a country, for me as a citizen of this country and as a participant in the initiative of the Group of Six—of the five continents as they put it—this is truly a satisfactory outcome which was difficult to envisage a short while ago. We did struggle and continue to struggle for an end to tests, for the extension of this agreement to medium- and short-range strategic missiles in Europe and, certainly, for an end to the militarization of space.

This is a big historic step which I believe is only the beginning. There is much still to be done. I hope that with the people's struggles and the correct judgement of political leaderships, we can one day live in a world, on a planet, free of nuclear weapons.

Mitsotakis on Agreement

NC191727 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 1700 GMT 19 Sep 87

[Text] In a statement, New Democracy Chairman Konstantinos Mitsotakis said yesterday's U.S.-Soviet agreement is the result of a realistic and responsible policy by both sides. The agreement also confirms that peace can only be consolidated through persistence, sincere efforts, and the restoration of mutual trust, and not through noisy manifestations or one-sided slogans for political exploitation.

KKE, Greek Left View Accord

NC182155 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 2100 GMT 18 Sep 87

[Text] The KKE Central Committee's Press Bureau has released a statement noting that the agreement reached in principle between the United States and the Soviet Union on the abolition of medium- and short-range missiles constitutes the first hopeful step toward nuclear disarmament which echoes the people's aspirations and struggles for peace.

The KKE wholeheartedly welcomes this hopeful step. It expresses its wish that this accord will be realized with the signing of a final agreement. The KKE further hopes that through new measures, the thrust of U.S. and Soviet policy will continue in the direction of totally eliminating nuclear arms from our planet.

The Greek Left Party's Press Bureau also issued a statement stressing that today's achievement proves that it is worth struggling for the highest goals, even if such goals appear to be very distant. The statement pointed out that the slogan "Neither Pershing nor SS-20" stood out as a utopia a few years ago; today it has become a reality.

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CSO: 5200/2404

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

CYPRUS' KIPRIANOU HAILS U.S.-SOVIET MISSILE ACCORD

NC191131 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1030 GMT 19 Sep 87

[Text] Together with all other countries of the world, Cyprus has warmly welcomed the agreement in principle between the United States and the Soviet Union on the conclusion of a treaty for the elimination of short-and medium-range nuclear missiles.

In a statement, President Kiprianou stressed that the progress made in the last 3 days is undoubtedly of decisive significance. We share the opinion, the president added, that the two governments' successful efforts to create an appropriate atmosphere that will contribute to the elimination of the nuclear threat constitutes a success for humanity and an objective achievement of supreme historical significance. We hope, Kiprianou concluded, that the planned meeting between the leaders of the two superpowers will result in decisive new steps in the direction of disarmament and the solution of various international problems.

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CSO: 5200/2405

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

IMPACT ON TURKEY OF POSSIBLE INF AGREEMENT

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 6 May 87 p 2

[Article by Yilmaz Usluer, retired admiral]

[Text] The nuclear forces of the United States and NATO are composed of two major parts: strategic and non-strategic. The non-strategic forces are divided (as "battlefield nuclear forces" or "tactical nuclear forces") into further sub-categories:

1. Longer Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces (LEINF): Their range is from 1,000 to 5,000. Pershing 2 (1,800 km), cruise missiles (2,500 km), and the Soviet SS-20 (5,000 km) and SS-4 (1,800 km) belong to this category.
2. Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF): Range from 150 to 1,000 km. Pershing 1A (740 km) and the Soviet (what they call short-range) SS-22 (900 km), SS-23 (500 km) and Scud (33 km) missiles belong to this category.
3. Short Range Nuclear Forces (SNF): These are missiles and rockets below the 150-km range. The U.S. Lance missile and Honest John free rocket (37 km) belong to that category.
4. Nuclear Capable Bombers and Fighter Jets.

Developments Concerning Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces

From 1976 onward the Soviet Union started to deploy SS-20 (5,000 km range), and increased their numbers over the years. In 1979 their numbers had reached 200 carrying and 600 warheads (an SS-missile carries 3 warheads). This caused worry in NATO circles, and the NATO Council convened in December 1979 to consider the growing imbalance in INF missiles. Among the resolutions taken at the meetings were: Modernization of NATO's INF systems (then Pershing 1A) by deploying longer-range missiles. Parallel to this, opening up negotiations with the Soviets to make mutual reductions in the INF--i.e. the 'two-track' decision.

But the deployment was not to take place immediately. The 108 Pershing 2 and 464 cruise missiles would not be deployed before December 1983. The door to negotiations was left open to the Soviets during that time. Because of the

ineffectiveness of SALT II and the problem created by the INF in Europe. President Reagan proposed the 'zero option' on 18 November 1981. He was proposing that if the Soviets agreed to remove their SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles NATO, in turn, would abstain from deploying the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles.

The Geneva and Reykjavik Summits

At the 1985 Geneva and 1986 Reykjavik summits there was agreement on a number of issues regarding the reduction and/or removal of the INF. But because of disagreements over SDI no positive results were forthcoming at the summits. At the start of the Reykjavik summit (11 October 1986) the INF balance stood as follows:

1. United States had a combined total of 268 ground-based cruise missiles and Pershing 2 (these carry only one warhead). Deployment was continuing to reach 572 warheads. The Soviet Union had 270 SS-20's containing 810 warheads. It also had 112 warheads in its SS-4.
2. The Soviets deployed 513 warheads in Asia.
3. The Soviets also maintain between 100-200 short range SS-22's and SS-23's, and about 200 shorter range 'Lance' missiles.

Had an agreement been concluded at Reykjavik, developments would have taken place as follows:

1. After 5 years only medium range Scud missiles would have been kept in Europe by both Soviets and Americans. The other missiles (SS-20, SS-4, cruise and Pershing 2) would have been removed;
2. The Soviets and Americans would have been allowed to keep 100 warheads each, in Asia and the United States respectively (SS-20 and cruise); and
3. Numbers of short range weapons would have been frozen. Shorter range weapons like Scud were to be subject to further negotiations.

Following Reykjavik, negotiations on nuclear weapons and space weapons resumed in Geneva. At these meetings studies on a separate draft agreement limiting INF weapons were intensified.

A Separate Agreement

On 1 March 1987 General Secretary Gorbachev made a proposal for a separate INF agreement. U.S. President Reagan and leaders of many Western countries have responded positively to this proposal. It is quite significant that the proposal is coming from Gorbachev at this time. Because, as was pointed out earlier, President Reagan and NATO have made several proposals concerning "disarmament and arms control", reductions in INF, their elimination and so on. NATO has even agreed to reduce warheads by 2,400 and without awaiting Soviet responses unilaterally set about doing just that. The current proposal, coming as it is from the Soviet leader, increases the likelihood of an agreement.

The failure to reach an agreement on space defense systems at the summits is going to have lesser impact on INF than it would on strategic missiles. I believe that an INF agreement has greater link to conventional forces. Therefore some Western countries may favor a more comprehensive agreement covering reductions in conventional forces rather than the present limited agreement. But however one goes about it, even a partial reduction in nuclear weapons is for the good of all mankind and all countries.

Preparations for a separate INF agreement are at an advanced stage. The two leaders agreed in principle at Reykjavik and experts have established the scope of INF reductions. The negotiations have been continuing in Geneva since the summit. An agreement can be reached in line with the understanding reached there.

The Agreement's Significance for Turkey

With horror and frightening effects of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons always kept in mind. Turkey wants to avoid having to possess them so long as it is possible, and is trying to help other countries and NATO get rid of those weapons as soon as possible.

Turkey is strongly supportive of a separate agreement on INF weapons. That is because with this agreement Turkey would be getting out of the range of SS-20 (5,000-km) missiles.

Turkey wants to see that the possible redeployment of 100 Soviet warheads in Asia should be done in such a way as to exclude Turkey from their range.

As Turkey's defense forces are composed of conventional forces this agreement will increase Turkey's importance within NATO even further. And that augmented significance is likely to bring added political and economic opportunities.

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CSO: 5200/2555

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TURKEY WELCOMES U.S.-USSR MISSILE AGREEMENT

TA181824 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1600 GMT 18 Sep 87

[Text] Turkey has welcomed the decision in principle reached between the U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers to sign an agreement to abolish intermediate-range nuclear missiles. A statement by the Foreign Ministry says that the abolition of these systems will significantly contribute to increased security in Europe and the world at large and to the promotion of relations between the East and West.

The statement says: The agreement to be signed for the abolition of intermediate-range nuclear missiles will be an example to bilateral and multilateral negotiations being conducted in favor of disarmament and the increasing of security, and will ensure their early conclusion.

The reductions in nuclear arms will naturally bring out the existing imbalance in conventional arms between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, the constructive stand of parties involved in talks for the reduction of conventional arms will gain importance.

Turkey supports all efforts for disarmament and is actively engaged in efforts to reach positive results.

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CSO: 5200/2406

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

CANADA: VANCOUVER SUN EDITORIAL ON GORBACHEV INF PROPOSAL

52200052 Vancouver THE SUN in English 1 Aug 87 p B6

[Editorial]

[Text]

Despite many recent distractions the impression remains that the United States and the Soviet Union are on a track that will lead them to a new arms control agreement, perhaps before the end of the year.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's latest offer of a world ban on both intermediate and short-range nuclear missiles was another nudge along the way.

Getting rid of Soviet missiles in Asia is a highly desirable goal but the price is proving sticky. What to do about European missiles not deployed by the U.S. was always a problem. It is simpler to isolate the missiles belonging to Britain and France than the U.S.-armed Pershings in West Germany. Although the use of the warheads is actually under U.S. control, the German air force decides where the Pershing missiles go.

However, this problem should not be insurmountable, and in the end the Pershings will probably have to go. There is a momentum about the negotiations that seems strong enough to persist, and Mr. Gorbachev is exploiting it masterfully. This is actually an incentive for some creative action by the U.S. which has now agreed to a meeting in the fall of foreign ministers that may well be the final stepping stone.

After the sad revelations about the relationship between President Ronald Reagan and key advisers who made up their own foreign policy, the U.S. needs a spirit-lifter and Mr. Reagan needs a better place in history than he can yet claim.

XINHUA VIEWS BONN'S DILEMMA OVER PERSHING'S

OW270640 Beijing XINHUA in English 0600 GMT 27 Aug 87

[By Xia Zhimian]

[Text] Bonn August 26 (XINHUA) — Federal German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Wednesday announcement on conditionally scrapping Germany's 72 short-range Pershing 1A missiles is a clear indication that Bonn is ready to relieve its dilemma of being sandwiched between the two superpowers disarmament negotiations.

On his return from vacation in Austria, Kohl said that Federal Germany would agree not to update the missiles if the United States and the Soviet Union reach an agreement on global dismantling of intermediate nuclear forces (INF).

Bonn's concession was made after Moscow insisted that the 72 Pershing 1As, carrying U.S.-controlled warheads, be dismantled because they constitute the last major obstacle to reaching a superpower missile accord.

Unwilling to get caught between the two superpowers, Bonn decided to solve the seemingly to-be-or-not-to-be problem, with certain conditions, after an intense debate.

Additional conditions for the scrapping include: the INF accord must settle the verification issue; it must be ratified by both sides; and both sides must stick to an agreed dismantling timetable.

These conditions might prove to be too harsh for Moscow and they puzzle some U.S. officials, but the move reflects flexibility in Bonn's policy. Federal Germany being the only third party involved in the U.S.-Soviet talks.

In April, when the Soviet Union tabled the double-zero option on demolishing shorter-range missiles, Bonn tried to align itself with other Western allies in persuading the U.S. to reject the Soviet proposal.

In Bonn's view, if all short- and medium-range U.S. missiles were demolished, Federal Germany would be

vulnerable to Soviet short-range missiles and conventional forces.

Bonn found itself isolated when Britain and France, the two Western European nuclear powers, declared themselves in favor of the double-zero option.

On June 1, Bonn made the first concession, announcing that it would accept the new Soviet proposal on two conditions: The 72 Pershing 1As deployed in Federal Germany be retained and superpower negotiations be held immediately on shorter-range missiles, conventional forces and chemical arsenals following an INF accord.

No sooner had Bonn made known its stand than the Soviet Union began to accuse it of preventing the two superpowers from reaching an INF accord.

Meanwhile, the U.S., eager to reach an agreement, hoped Bonn would make some concessions, although publicly Washington voiced support for Bonn.

Besides the pressure Bonn faced internationally, the issue had also provoked heated debate at home.

The opposition urged the government not to "sabotage" the American-Soviet negotiations.

Even within the government, some advocated a change in the missile stand in order to avoid the resentment of the voters.

With these considerations in mind, Bonn changed its tune.

The latest concession has at least two aims — to satisfy Moscow's request to scrap the pershings, and to maintain the essence of Bonn's original stand on retaining them because, in any event, they will be obsolete and ineffective by 1992 if not updated.

The five-year period between now and 1992 coincides with the period of implementation of a superpower INF accord, should it be reached late this year as expected.

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CSO: 5200/4019

BEIJING REVIEW: BONN PROPOSAL HOPEFUL

52004021 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English Vol 30 No 35, 7 Sep 87 p 11

[Article by Xia Ren]

[Text] The recent suggestion by Bonn that Federal Germany might give up its Pershing-IAs in exchange for the removal of Soviet Scud missiles stationed in Eastern Europe could be a solution to the deadlock in U.S.-Soviet talks on medium-range missiles.

Hopes rose for a deal that would eliminate the last remaining stumbling block to a US-Soviet arms deal when the Federal German Parliamentary leader, Alfred Dregger, said recently that he has no objection to the removal of 72 Pershing-IA shorter-range missiles from Federal Germany on the condition that Moscow withdraws its short-range SS-1B Scud missiles from Eastern Europe. The Bonn government has reportedly been discussing with the United States and its European allies the possibility of removing the Pershing-IAs in exchange for the Soviet Union's withdrawal of short-range missiles stationed in Democratic Germany and Czechoslovakia. The 160 Soviet missiles, with a range of 300 kilometres, are directed at Federal Germany.

Bonn is facing increasing pressure because its Pershing-IAs are the only remaining obstacle to a US-Soviet agreement on the elimination of global medium-range missiles. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze accused Federal Germany of trying to become a nuclear power by maintaining the missiles and interfering with the arms negotiations. Moscow maintains that Bonn has no right to possess nuclear arms.

The Pershing-IAs in Federal Germany belong to Bonn, but their nuclear warheads are under

the control of the United States. The Soviets are adamant that the missiles must be included in the arms talks; otherwise, the Soviets have said, they will insist on keeping 100 medium-range missiles in Asia. The United States maintains that the Pershing-IAs belong to a third country and will not be included in the Geneva superpower disarmament talks. US Secretary of State George Shultz has informed Bonn that the Pershing-IAs will not be sacrificed in the negotiations.

Deployed in the 1970s the Pershing-IAs are scheduled to be phased out by 1989. Washington insists that retaining them is for the benefit of its West European allies, especially Federal Germany. Bonn believes the Pershing-IAs would offset Moscow's advantage in short-range missiles and conventional weapons.

On August 19, the Soviet official news agency TASS charged that Washington, by retaining its nuclear warheads for 72 Pershing-IA missiles, intends to remain the sole possessor of shorter-range nuclear weapons after the two superpowers sign an agreement on removing their medium- and shorter-range missiles on a global basis. A Soviet spokesman said recently that if the West does not abandon the Pershing-IAs in Federal Germany, the Soviet Union will

deploy the same number of a similar type of missiles in the German Democratic Republic.

Jurgen Todenhof, disarmament policy spokesman for the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union Party coalition in Federal Germany, said that the Soviet insistence on including Federal Germany's Pershing-IAs in the Geneva arms talks is motivated by its strategic goals in Europe—to force the Americans out of Europe, eliminate nuclear weapons from the region, prevent its political unity and establish a so-called collective security system under Moscow's control. The spokesman added that the Pershing missiles, fitted with nuclear warheads controlled by Washington, symbolize non-nuclear Federal Germany's close military ties with the United States. With the elimination of these missiles, the Soviets would be one step closer to their goal of total nuclear disarmament in Western Europe.

While it is not yet clear whether Bonn's latest proposal will be accepted, it will have to be considered by the United States and the Soviet Union if they are determined to reach an agreement on medium-range missiles this year. A deal would probably be possible as long as Federal Germany's security is assured. ■

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC RESPONSE TO U.S.-USSR INF ACCORD

Foreign Ministry on Accord

OW190650 Beijing XINHUA in English 0637 GMT 19 Sep 87

[Text] Beijing, September 19 (XINHUA)—A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said today that China welcomes the U.S.-Soviet agreement in principle on intermediate-range missiles.

The spokesman made this remark while answering a question raised by correspondents here today.

"China's position on the arms reduction talks between the United States and the Soviet Union is known to all.

"We welcome the United States and the Soviet Union reaching an agreement in principle on intermediate-range missiles and hope that the agreement will be truly implemented with the destruction of their longer and shorter intermediate-range missiles deployed in both Europe and Asia," the spokesman said.

RENMIN RIBAO Commentary

HK210731 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 20 Sep 87 p 6

[Commentary by RENMIN RIBAO reporter Jing Xianfa (2529 2009 3127): "The U.S.-Soviet Foreign Ministers' Meeting and New Progress in Medium-Range Missile Talks"]

[Text] Through 3 days of intense talks the U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers finally reached a principled agreement on 17 September about dismantling all medium-range missiles. Both sides agreed that when Reagan and Gorbachev hold their summit meeting this autumn in Washington, they will sign a formal agreement.

Both sides agreed to dismantle the following missiles: The 256 cruise and 108 Pershing-2 missiles deployed by the United States in Western Europe; the 441 SS-20, 112 SS-4, and 130 medium- and short-range missiles deployed by the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia. In the talks both sides also agreed to make efforts to reach an agreement on reducing their offensive strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent, and to begin negotiations by 1 December to stop all underground nuclear tests and prohibit all chemical weapons.

Reaching a principled agreement on dismantling all medium-range missiles belonging to the two countries was the main result of the U.S.-Soviet foreign ministers meeting. After the Iceland summit meeting last October, the United States and the Soviet Union kept arguing about the scope and timing of the dismantling. In late July this year Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union was willing to give up its requirement to maintain 100 medium-range warheads in Asia. That is, to accept the "global double zero option." This broke the deadlock in the talks on medium-range missiles. However, the United States insisted that "the bilateral talks should not involve any third country's nuclear weapons," and rejected the Soviet Union's requirement of including West Germany's Pershing-1A missiles in the "double zero option." This again brought the medium-range missile talks to deadlock.

Through intense bargaining both sides made concessions at the foreign ministers meeting. The Soviet side gave up its demand that all West German Pershing-1A nuclear warhead missiles be dismantled within 1 year, and agreed that the United States first dismantles its missiles in West Germany before withdrawing the nuclear warheads. The United States agreed that the nuclear warheads withdrawn from West Germany be included in the category of its existing medium- and short-range missiles and will be dismantled according to the agreement. Thus, the two sides finally removed obstacles to their medium-range missiles talks.

The United States and the Soviet Union made progress in their medium-range missiles talks due to their respective needs. In the United States President Reagan's tenure will soon come to an end. The medium-range missiles agreement will make up for losses to his reputation caused by the "Irangate" incident, and will leave an image of a President who "made valuable contributions to U.S.-Soviet relations." As for Gorbachev's willingness to make concessions in the talks, the analysts here said that his main considerations include domestic economic reforms and a proper posture toward the West.

Even so some important issues, such as the time limits for destruction of medium- and short-range missiles and effective verification measures, have not yet been solved in the talks. The U.S. opinion media strongly reacted to the U.S.-Soviet foreign ministers meeting. It is generally held that the agreement on medium-range missiles between the two nuclear powers represented a "significant and positive step." The U.S. Congress also welcomed President Reagan's action. On the other hand, the hardliners headed by Secretary for Defense Weinberger are worried that after the United States withdraws the medium-range missiles, there will be gaps in the defense of Western Europe. Of course if the United States and the Soviet Union can finally reach a medium-range agreement, this will undoubtedly be a positive step in easing current international tension. However, the medium- and short-range missiles account for a mere 5 percent of the United States and Soviet Union's total nuclear arsenal, so the medium-range missile agreement is merely a minor step toward freeing mankind from the nuclear threat.

XINHUA Commentary

OW191238 Beijing XINHUA in English 1215 GMT 19 Sep 87

["Commentary: U.S.-Soviet INF Tentative Agreement, A Step Deserving Welcome (by Shi Lujia)"]--XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, September 18 (XINHUA)—U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze ended their three-day meeting today with an agreement in principle on eliminating all intermediate-range missiles of the superpowers. The INF treaty will be signed at a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting later this year, they said.

This is a step forward on the long way of disarmament. The step, though not a great one, deserves welcome.

According to the joint statement of the two foreign ministers, the main blocks to reaching an INF treaty have been removed. It is not too difficult for the negotiators of the two countries in Geneva to solve such technical problems as the timetable of eliminating the missiles and the details of verification measures.

The two foreign ministers are confident that the INF agreement will be finalized late in October when they meet again in Moscow.

Under the tentative agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union will eliminate all medium-range missiles with a range of 1,000-5,000 kilometers and shorter-range missiles with a range of 500-1,000 kilometers during the next 3-5 years.

That is to say that the Soviet Union has to eliminate the 441 SS-20 and the 112 SS-4 missiles in Europe and Asia and the 130 SS-12 and SS-23 missiles in Eastern Europe while the United States has to scrap the 332 Pershing-2 missiles and Tomahawk land-based cruise missiles in Western Europe and stop deploying the planned 240 cruise missiles. This is the first agreement between the two countries that does not limit the growth of missiles but reduces the nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the two foreign minister have also made progress in banning underground nuclear tests, prohibiting chemical weapons and reducing the conventional forces of the two countries in Europe.

The two superpowers have the biggest nuclear and conventional arsenals and, therefore, naturally bear the greatest responsibility for disarmament. However, for many years, they have taken few actions though they negotiated repeatedly on the subject. Meanwhile, they have escalated the arms race, extending it from the ground, the sea and the air into the outer space.

Although the expected INF treaty cannot change essentially the trend of the arms race between the superpowers nor be enough to ensure peace and security in Europe, it is welcomed as one step forward on the way to disarmament by the world. A small reduction is better than no change at all and an eased tension is better than an aggravated one.

However, Shultz and Shevardnadze have not made much progress in reducing the strategic offensive weapons and prohibiting the space weapons, the two main areas of the arms race between the two superpowers and the source of threats to world peace.

The intermediate-range weapons constitute only a small part of the huge U.S.-Soviet nuclear arsenals. The role of these weapons has become less important as the arms race develops. The United States and the Soviet Union can threaten each other and the world with thousands of strategic nuclear weapons they possess and the space weapons they are developing at an accelerated speed.

Obviously, the two countries have redoubled their efforts to strengthen their strategic forces in recent years. At the end of 1986, the United States officially abrogated the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) signed in 1979 with the Soviet Union and went beyond the limit of the treaty in the number of strategic weapons. The Soviet Union announced last August that it had started deploying the new SS-24 inter-continental ballistic missiles, each of which can carry 10 warheads. Shultz insisted even today that the United States cannot accept any restraints on the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), the so-called "Star Wars" system.

Both Shultz and Shevardnadze stressed today that the tentative INF agreement is just a "beginning." They have promised to continue their efforts to negotiate on the strategic and space weapons. However, this is just what the peace-loving people of the world want them to do.

The U.S.-Soviet contention is the main source of upheavals in the world today. Shultz and Shevardnadze have not gained much in ending regional conflicts either. The world people are expecting them to continue their efforts on this issue and contribute to easing the world tension.

CHINA DAILY Commentary

HK211013 Beijing CHINA DAILY in English 21 Sep 87 p 4

[By CHINA DAILY commentator: "Missile Accord"]

[Text] The United States and the Soviet Union have reached an agreement in principle to scrap all their intermediate nuclear missiles throughout the world. Faithful implementation of this agreement would mean the elimination of a whole category of nuclear arms, which marks real progress in the history of arms reduction talks. It is quite understandable that the news has been widely received with satisfaction as an encouraging development in the fight for world peace and disarmament.

Having dragged on for six years, the medium range missile talks between the two superpowers travelled an arduous and zigzag road. It was only in the last 12 months that both sides displayed flexibility and accommodation as each dropped one demand after another that had thrown up obstacles to an agreement. The result was that they were moving ever closer to each other up to last Friday's tentative accord to conclude an INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) treaty at a summit later this year between their leaders. This is an achievement which

should not only be credited to the sagacity of the politicians. Primarily, it is a victory of the people across the world who have consistently championed peace and disarmament by their action.

China stands for peace and disarmament. The Chinese Government has time and again made known its position that a universal agreement on a total ban and finally dismantling of all nuclear arms is the aim of nuclear disarmament and the two superpowers, with the largest nuclear arsenals, should take the lead in reducing such arms. The Chinese people have all along watched with great concern the ups and downs of the arms reduction talks between the two superpowers and hoped for positive results. Now that there is agreement of importance, they certainly welcome it with all their hearts.

However, issues have yet to be resolved before the agreement is finalized. And to put words on paper into acts is often not easy. This will take time and strenuous effort. It is our hope that an honest and expeditious implementation will take place as soon as the agreement is concluded.

Moreover, intermediate nuclear weapons account for only a small portion of the massive nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers. Even if the INF is scrapped in compliance with the agreement, the nuclear threat to humanity is still grave. Both the U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze have admitted that it is only "a beginning" if they agree to ban the INF. There are many more nuclear weapons remaining than will be eliminated by this accord.

Strategic offensive nuclear weapons and conventional armaments are among the serious questions calling for great attention and proper settlement. With the INF agreement in hand, there should be an improved climate of mutual confidence between the superpowers even though they both claim that serious differences exist in many areas between them. The fact their representatives have agreed to make similar efforts for a 50 per cent reduction of the strategic nuclear arsenals is a good sign.

The world's people will be waiting and seeing if any substantial progress is made in the next few months benefiting peace and security.

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CSN: 52004022

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA PRAISES U.S.-USSR INF PLAN

OW201446 Beijing XINHUA in English 1433 GMT 20 Sep 87

["News Analysis: Soviet-U.S. INF Outline Praiseworthy (by Tang Xiushan)"]--
XINHUA headline]

[Text] Moscow, September 20 (XINHUA)—Moscow heaved a sigh of relief when news came in that the United States had finally agreed "in principle" to conclude a treaty with the Soviet Union on banning intermediate-range nuclear missiles and thus a summit became possible.

Moscow's pleasure is understandable: the INF outline reached at the last minute of the talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, is no easy job.

Since the two superpowers resumed talks on nuclear weapons in Geneva in January, 1985, bitter quarrels between the delegations have become routine fare.

To iron out major differences, the foreign affairs chiefs of the two countries shuffled between Moscow and Washington and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan flew to Geneva and Reykjavik to hold summit talks.

Moscow's flexible policy helped reach an agreement, it agreed to single out the medium-range missile issue from the package plan, to eradicate shorter-range missiles in line with "double-zero" options, to eradicate its medium-range missiles deployed in the Asian part of Soviet territory, and to carry out strict monitoring measures on nuclear inspection.

The Soviet Union had insisted upon a blanket settlement of the strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons issues and the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars). Then Gorbachev proposed the single-out on February 28 this year.

Of course, Washington's willingness to compromise also contributed to the agreement. Shevardnadze said in Washington Friday that he thanks Shultz for his cooperation. The Soviet foreign minister also praised Reagan for his role in the talks.

The tentative agreement reflects the needs of Washington and Moscow.

For Washington, Reagan, whose reputation was badly damaged by the Iran-Contra incident, wants to earn a reputation as a peace-loving president in the next 16 months before his presidency ends, and wants to boost the Republicans' chances in next year's general elections.

For Moscow, Gorbachev wants to take advantage of the agreement to improve Soviet-U.S. ties, to ease international tension so that he can pursue his economic program in a favorable climate.

Despite the tentative agreement, many difficulties remain unresolved. For example, details of the agreement are still to be worked out and it's not an easy job. From the broader point of view, overall Soviet-U.S. ties are still at odds. "We have serious differences in many areas," says Reagan, and "there are still many difficulties and contradictions in Soviet-U.S. relations," says Shevardnadze.

SOVIET JOURNAL REVIEWS NEW EDITION OF BOOK ON DISARMAMENT

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNIYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 87 (signed to press 15 Jun 87) pp 144-148

[Excerpt]The reader wishing to familiarize himself with topical problems of world politics and international relations could usefully turn to the collection "Peace and Disarmament. Scientific Studies. 1987" (Academician P.N. Fedoseyev, chief editor, Moscow, "Nauka", 1987, pp 544). The present edition is the fourth in the series of basic publications of the Scientific Council for the Study of Peace and Disarmament. The publication is also being translated into English, French, Spanish and German.

The material of this edition--and this is its characteristic feature--reflects the process of the rethinking of the realities of contemporary world development and the quest for new approaches to the solution of fundamental problems of the survival of mankind in the light of the propositions and conclusions of the 27th CPSU Congress embodying the new philosophy of international intercourse. The authors cogently explain the essence and focus of the USSR's foreign policy initiatives of a fundamental nature actualizing the wide-ranging action program advanced by the congress for the purpose of the creation of an all-embracing system of international security and man's deliverance from the threat of an all-exterminating catastrophe.

Subjecting in a special series of articles the American "star wars" plans to searching criticism, the experts show the disastrous nature of them for all mankind and emphasize in this connection the need for and possibility of broad international cooperation in realization of programs of the peaceful conquest of space.

"Never before has science played such a huge part in society, never before has the fate of civilization depended on it to such extent," A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, observes in his article "For a World Without Nuclear Weapons, Approaching the 21st Century," which opens the collection. The published material reveals the active position and diverse intensive activity of Soviet scientists and various social organizations of the USSR in the struggle for peace, disarmament, a halt to the testing of nuclear weapons and a radical improvement in the international situation.

The final section of the book is of undoubted interest also. Documents and material connected with the foreign policy initiatives of the CPSU and the Soviet state, a chronical of scientific meetings and conferences on peace and disarmament and also a detailed annotated bibliography of national works on this subject matter which have appeared since the publication of the preceding edition (1984) are contained here.

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PRC URGES FURTHER DISARMAMENT AFTER INF

OW232254 Beijing XINHUA in English 2207 GMT 23 Sep 87

[Text] United Nations, September 23 (XINHUA)—China today urged the United States and the Soviet Union to complete their INF treaty and go on with the negotiations on disarmament in other areas.

Speaking during today's general debate of the 42nd Session of the UN General Assembly, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian said that all people hope the United States and the Soviet Union to "proceed to conduct earnest negotiations on disarmament in other areas and reach agreements," after they reach an INF agreement.

"The international community strongly hopes that the United States and the Soviet Union will drastically reduce their armaments as soon as possible," he said.

Wu welcomed the progress made in the U.S.-Soviet INF talks recently. He said the expected INF treaty to thoroughly destroy the medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe and Asia "would be a first step towards nuclear arms reduction."

However, even with all the medium- and shorter-range missiles dismantled, he said, "The nuclear weaponry of the United States and the Soviet Union would be reduced by less than five percent. Their nuclear forces can still destroy the world several times over."

Therefore, Wu said, "There should be complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all types of nuclear, space, chemical and biological weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction, and a substantial conventional arms reduction."

Wu called on the United States and the Soviet Union to "take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear and conventional armaments." "This is the key to progress in disarmament," he said.

He also asked the two superpowers not to waste their efforts by developing even more sophisticated new types of weapons.

Progress in disarmament requires the persistent efforts of all peace-loving countries and people, he said. "All countries, whether big, small or medium-sized, nuclear or non-nuclear, should have an equal say and each has a positive role to play," he added.

The Chinese foreign minister praised the recent UN International Conference on Disarmament and Development as "of positive significance". The conference has deepened the international community's understanding of the close relationship between disarmament and development, he noted.

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